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Throughout history, wherever militaries have moved, camped and fought, in peacetime as well as 
war, disease has followed. Over the past several centuries, as expeditionary movements have 
become more widespread, the threat infectious disease has posed to military strength has become 
correspondingly broader. For this reason, the U.S military has long implemented measures to 
protect the health of its troops; over the past century or so, this has meant research programs 
intended to develop and test prophylaxis and therapies for the many infectious threats faced by 
troops. Despite relatively limited resources and funding, the military has achieved ample success, 
particularly in the realm of vaccine development, which is for obvious reasons the ideal approach 
to handling disease risk in a large, vulnerable population.  
 
Because of the expeditionary history of the U.S. military, the diseases of interest to military 
doctors and researchers are often those of interest in the developing world; to this day, diseases 
prevalent in these areas remain either poorly understood, significantly under-funded, or lacking 
in effective treatments—often all three. Borne by mosquitoes and other vectors, non-potable 
water, and overcrowding, many of them are neglected by pharmaceutical companies—which 
lack a profit motive in poor countries—and by researchers in the areas most affected by them—
who often lack the resources to investigate them. Since the 1940s, military researchers have 
worked closely with allied governments in a number of settings where these diseases are 
prevalent, from Egypt to Peru to Thailand and beyond. From collaborating on basic science 
research to conducting major clinical trials in local populations, these multi-national partnerships 
have been incredibly fruitful for U.S. military research; however, host nations have not always 
obtained the same benefit from collaborative research as the U.S. military. The mission of these 
combined research institutes and endeavors, which is unequivocally focused on research 
achievements for military ends, is one explanation for the disparity in outcomes; the U.S military 
process for technology production, which is in many ways fragmented and decentralized, is 
another. Distribution of vaccines within the free market has historically been an afterthought for 
military researchers, and sometimes barely a thought at all, much to the detriment of the 
military’s research partners and sometimes to the military itself. 
 
This paper will investigate the history of U.S. military vaccine development, and the current 
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process and projects. It will explore several case studies that provide a glimpse of those very 
processes and projects as they unfolded, focusing specifically on the outcome for our military 
and research partners. And it will present the basics of how the world of public health looks at 
vaccine accessibility in the developing world. Using this background, I will look to assess the 
U.S. military process of vaccine development and provide recommendations about how it might 






Yellow Jack – Disease and Death in the US Military 
In the spring of 1862, one year into the Civil War, Union Major General Benjamin Butler arrived 
in the city of New Orleans with 5,000 troops. The citizens of New Orleans were far from 
enthusiastic about the unopposed capture of their city and the installation of a Union occupying 
force in their streets, but these unwelcoming locals were just one of MG Butler’s concerns. The 
threat posed by yellow fever, which was the source of “the city’s reputation as one of the 
unhealthiest places to live in the United States” was likely more in the forefront of his mind. 
Less than a decade earlier, an epidemic had sickened 29,000 and killed nearly 8,000 people—an 
estimated 10% of the city’s population. (1-3) 
 
Aggressive sanitation efforts were MG Butler’s first priority to prevent the disease in his troops, 
few of whom had any immunity from past infections. Bitter New Orleans residents recognized 
this, and many hoped that the scourge of yellow fever would fell a decisive blow on the 
occupying Northerners and swing the war in favor of the South. Fortunately for Butler, his public 
health measures were effective in New Orleans that year and subsequent ones. Although the 
disease raged along the Gulf Coast, affecting Union forces from the Florida Keys to Galveston 
that year, New Orleans remained relatively unscathed. (4) Indeed, from 1862-1865, yellow fever 
deaths in the city remained far lower than they had been before and would be after—a total of 
just 11 deaths over the four years, compared to nearly 5000 in 1858 and over 3000 in 1867. (1) 
 
Despite the relatively mild impact on troops in New Orleans, the significant effect of yellow 
fever on military operations was well recognized; unfortunately, prevention was hindered in 
many cases by an incomplete understanding of the disease, its etiology and its treatment. In 
1867, Brevet Lieut Col. J.J. Woodward drew the following conclusion in a “Report on Epidemic 
Cholera and Yellow Fever,” which he produced for the Surgeon General of the War Department  
highlighting the effect of disease throughout the region: 
 
It is to be regretted that the experience of the army throws no more satisfactory 
light on the treatment of the disease, but it must be admitted that it is most 
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instructive with regard to measures of prevention. Besides those general hygienic 
precautions which are so important in the prevention or mitigation of all epidemic 
disease, two simple effective measures would appear to be specially indicated by 
the experience of the army during war and subsequently. The first is quarantine, 
as a means of preventing the introduction of the disease; the second is the prompt 
movement of the command to some rural site on the appearance of the fever 
among the citizens of the town at which it is stationed, or even after the disease 
has appeared among the men of the command itself. (5) 
 
The report effectively describes not only the epidemiology but also the geography and timeline 
of disease spread among the military in the late 1860s—199 cases and 79 deaths in Galveston, 
peaking in September; 823 cases in New Orleans with 219 deaths, peaking just a few weeks 
later. Ten Army medical officers died. (5) What it does less effectively is identify appropriate 
strategies to reduce disease transmission—Woodward’s conclusions suggest that he believed 
yellow fever to be transmissible between individuals, and perhaps related to some environmental 
or hygiene factors. It would be 33 years before another Army medical officer, MAJ Walter Reed, 
would provide proof of the etiology of yellow fever—the theory of mosquitos as a vector had 
been proposed but had not gained mainstream acceptance years earlier—and modify the 
conclusions of 1867:  
 
Yellow fever is transmitted to the non-immune individual by means of the bite of 
the mosquito that has previously fed on the blood of those sick with this 
disease…yellow fever is not conveyed by fomites, and hence disinfection of 
clothing, bedding, or merchandise, supposedly contaminated by contact with those 
sick with this disease, is unnecessary  
 
Reed wrote these words in his 1901 article in the Journal of the American Medical Association. 
(6) Personal hygiene, then, played little role in disease transmission, although sanitation policies 
might be useful in destroying mosquito breeding ground; likewise, movement to a rural site 
might theoretically prevent cases, but not for the reasons Woodward had likely believed. With 
Walter Reed’s work, a major step-forward in infectious disease medicine in general and military 
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medicine specifically had been made; generations later, Walter Reed would remain a famous 
name in medical history, and to this day the most well known military hospital is named for him. 
His discovery spurred interest in yellow fever, leading quickly thereafter to implementation of 
vector control measures that would save lives throughout the Americas and later to the 
development of a vaccine against yellow fever.  
 
The story of yellow fever is just one of many that could be used as a paradigmatic example of the 
significance of infectious diseases in American military history. Like military researchers who 
would follow him, Walter Reed had been motivated by the scale of an infectious disease problem 
he encountered; he used the knowledge of local experts and his ability to work “on the ground” in 
Cuba to his advantage; he made a significant step forward in understanding and management of 
the disease; and ultimately, his findings were gained based on models that provided asymmetric 
benefit. Its overwhelming influence on campaigns shaped the behavior of commanders and 
limited their tactical and even strategic capabilities. It demanded the attention of military 
physicians, and each advancement in understanding of the disease had ripple effects across the 
United States and the world. And ultimately, while intermediate methods of managing the 
disease had an important impact, development of a vaccine was always the goal, and clearly the 
most effective approach to turning the disease from a menace to a memory. 
 
Moving Forward 
With this brief introduction to military research and the role that infectious disease has played in 
the history of the American military, we will move on to a deeper investigation of the history 
behind military vaccine research; this will be supplemented with background on the current state 
of military research. All of this will ultimately allow me to delve a bit deeper into a few case 
studies that will help us not only to draw conclusions about the process of collaboration with 
outside organizations, particularly industry, but also to evaluate outcomes of these partnerships. 
It is no surprise that the military has taken an active role in the development of vaccines and 
treatments for the infectious disease threats to military operations. As in the past, today's military 
research efforts focus on the potential infectious threats that the military faces and as in the past, 
these diseases are significant to public health, particularly in the developing world.  
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To better elucidate the military’s pathways to research and their relationships with foreign 
partners, industry, and nonprofits, we will examine research through a series of vaccine case 
studies. Through these case studies, I will attempt to support the argument that the military has 
an incredible ability to foster the development of important medical technologies, but that it 
often fails in its duties to its partners and allies, and should consider how it should support them 
better not just because it is ethically appropriate, but because it would be mutually advantageous. 
The first case, the development of the hepatitis A vaccine, might be ruled a partial success for the 
military, as a safe, effective, and highly available vaccine has been approved by the FDA and 
produced by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) since the early 1990s; however, that availability does not 
extend to most low and middle income countries, including the one, Thailand, in which it was 
primarily tested with our research partner organizations. The second story would easily be called 
a failure, with an effective vaccine being tainted by ethical concerns surrounding its testing in 
Nepal, and completion of research and testing halted after phase II trials due to a perceived lack 
of profit potential on the part of industry partner GSK. The third, inspired by both the Thai desire 
to reduce cases of Japanese Encephalitis and a high profile American death from the disease, 
might be ruled a success, as both populations involved in its development gained access to the 
vaccine. The fourth is the ongoing story of malaria vaccination, and it provides an example of 
how modern vaccine development for a major global disease is fostering the development of 
new, innovative partnerships among diverse partners. We will follow this section with a 
discussion of the current policy and ethical milieu surrounding vaccine access and an assessment 
of the lessons learned from the military experience. Finally, we will close with a discussion of 













Military Contributions to Infectious Disease Research: A Brief History 
The American military, and particularly the Army, has a long and well-documented history of 
medical innovation, particularly in the realm of infectious disease. As the example of yellow 
fever shows, the nature of historical and modern conflict has been the driving force pushing the 
military into this work—not only does combat demand creative solutions to complex injuries 
sustained on the battlefield, it requires that military physicians face the threat posed by a more 
insidious and historically deadly foe—disease. (7) In fact, the connection between the American 
military and medical innovation developed in our nation's earliest days. In 1777, after facing 
several devastating blows to his combat strength from smallpox—including defeat at the Battle 
of Quebec after his task force commander and over 50% of his troops became smallpox 
casualties—General George Washington undertook a campaign to inoculate all new and 
susceptible troops against the infection. His effort, dubbed by many as the first major military 
inoculation program in history, ensured the stability of the Continental Army through the end of 
the Revolutionary War—the British had previously used smallpox in a biodefense capacity, and 
most been infected as children or inoculated in England. (8, 9) The Civil War saw commanders 
like MG Butler and his peers struggle not just with yellow fever, but with malaria, smallpox, 
measles, typhoid, diarrheal disease, pneumonia and numerous others; two-thirds of the deaths in 
that war resulted from disease rather than combat, and disease may have lengthened the course of 
the war on the order of several years. (10) The Spanish-American War prompted increased 
military interest in both typhoid and yellow fevers. In 1900, a military commission established 
by President McKinley and directed by MAJ Walter Reed made its landmark discovery about the 
transmission of yellow fever, work that led to improved vector control in Cuba and Central 
America and had an almost immediate impact during the building of the Panama Canal. Before 
the late-1904 implementation of massive efforts to rid the isthmus of Panama of mosquitoes, 
some 85% of canal workers had been hospitalized with infection. Two years later, in late-1906, 
the disease was essentially under control, with no further deaths after that year. (11) Such major 
successes in yellow fever prevention—Havana, for example, saw annual deaths from yellow 
fever drop from 1300 to just 20 over a brief five year span—attracted substantial philanthropic 
interest in the military's public health efforts. (12) This interest resulted in a yellow fever vaccine 
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developed by the Rockefeller Institute, and this vaccine was used extensively by the military in 
World War II (although ironically, it resulted in the large-scale transmission of hepatitis B 
among vaccinated troops). (13, 14) Typhoid, which killed 1,620 American soldiers and infected 
ten-times that many during the Spanish-American War, resulted in a vaccine much more quickly, 
with MAJ Frederick Russell developing one in 1909 that quickly found utility in World War I. In 
this much larger conflict, infections and casualties from typhoid were ten-fold lower than during 
the Spanish-American war—227 deaths and just 2000 infections—due to a massive vaccination 
effort within the military. (8) 
 
World War I represented the last American conflict in which disease would cause more 
casualties than combat—57,460 deaths from infection compared to 50,280 from combat action.1 
Some two decades later, the picture in World War II was starkly different, with disease as a 
cause of death falling to 1 in 1000 casualties; by this time, the introduction of penicillin 
supplemented vaccines in controlling infection. (15-17) However, both conflicts inspired 
continued disease research and vaccine production as infectious disease, even when non-fatal, 
still had major implications for combat strength and campaign planning. American intervention 
in World War I coincided with and may have contributed to the influenza pandemic of 1918-
1919, and the dramatic impact of the disease on the military—1.5% of the entire military fighting 
force died from influenza and 20-40% were infected during the height of the pandemic—
prompted military research efforts to produce an influenza vaccine. (18, 19) By World War II, 
vaccination of troops against influenza A (beginning in 1943) and both influenza A and B (by 
1945) was underway using vaccines developed from virus isolated by Dr. Thomas Francis, Jr., 
then director of the Board for Investigation and Control of Influenza and Other Epidemic Disease 
in the Army (later known as the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board). (18) Similarly, military 
experience with meningococcal meningitis in World War I prompted the establishment of a 
research commission at the outset of World War II, although it wasn't until the Vietnam War era 
                                                
1 While World War I may have been the end of infections killing more troops than combat, the question 
of non-combat versus combat mortality in war remains significant even today. In the war in Iraq, overall 
non-combat mortality never surpassed deaths due to hostile action (although there were month to month 
fluctuations). In Afghanistan, non-combat mortality marginally exceeded combat in the early years of the 
war, but this pattern reversed in 2005 and never reverted.  Although it is difficult to attribute directly to 
combat, total veteran suicide over the years of these wars would, however, easily exceed combat deaths, 
and active duty deaths by suicide surpassed combat deaths starting in 2012. 
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that researchers at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research were able to isolate and purify the 
meningococcal polysaccharides that are still used in meningitis vaccines today. (18, 20) 
Outbreaks of respiratory disease during World War II prompted studies of acute respiratory 
distress syndrome (ARDS) in military settings. Identification of adenoviruses—a major cause of 
ARDS found to infect up to 80% of new military recruits—followed, and by 1958 a vaccine was 
developed. When problems with the initial vaccine were identified, a new and impressively 
effective orally administered vaccine was developed by the military (although supply chain 
problems ultimately led to a long period when the vaccine was unavailable). (18, 20) Military 
experiences with hepatitis A and B during both World Wars led to passive immunization efforts 
during the Korean War that conferred temporary immunity to deployed troops; cooperation 
between the military, NIH, and private industry led to the development of a hepatitis A vaccine 
in the late-1980s. In addition, military research on Vietnam War veterans established 
epidemiological proof of widespread Hepatitis B infection in this population, and these data were 
significant in prompting the development of a vaccine for that disease as well. (18) 
 
In more recent history, infectious disease research coupled with improvements in field hygiene 
and medicine have improved the military's ability to overcome infectious diseases. Nonetheless, 
even in the past decade disease has challenged the successful execution of military operations 
around the world, and research continues. A series of vaccines have been created for Japanese 
encephalitis, all based primarily on military research and development and licensed to various 
private corporations for production. The impetus for American research into Japanese 
encephalitis dates to the attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941, with the first form of the vaccine 
developed during World War II.  (18, 20, 21) The current form, approved by the FDA in 2009, 
continues to be administered to soldiers, sailors and marines deploying to Asia. (22) Since the 
Gulf War and through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, cutaneous leishmaniasis—a parasitic 
disease spread by sand flies—has presented a persistent problem. With no effective prophylaxis 
and requisite evacuation to Walter Reed Army Medical Center for treatment, the infection is of 
significant concern, and in the first year of conflict in Iraq, some 600 infections occurred. (23) 
During the same timeframe, a far smaller deployment of 225 Marines to Liberia to provide 
embassy support resulted in 80 cases of malaria, 44 of which required evacuation to American 
military hospitals. Although ineffective employment of prophylaxis was implicated in the 
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infections, the effect on mission was unchanged, underscoring the importance of preventative 
methods that are effective, easily employed, and not hampered by side effects. (24) In fact, some 
speculate that the failure of Marines to use prophylaxis while in Liberia was the result of the 
unfavorable side effect profile of mefloquine (itself developed by the military in the 1970s), 
which now carries a black box warning due to the potential for neurological and psychiatric side 
effects. (25, 26) 
 
Military Research Institutions: Early Development at Home 
At the time of Walter Reed, much research happened in the field—his was primarily conducted 
in Cuba—but a framework had been established for a centralized home for military research in 
the United States. Founded in 1893, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), 
which today represents the oldest and largest medical research organization in the United States 
military (the famed Armed Forces Institute of Pathology would be several decades older had it 
not closed in 2011), recently celebrated its 120th anniversary. At the time of its founding by then 
surgeon general BG George M. Sternberg, WRAIR was known as the Army Medical School, in 
recognition of the vision that it should be a center of professional education, and its first dean 
was the illustrious Walter Reed. Although it focused heavily on its education mission in early 
years, the Army Medical School also served as a hub for various research commissions and 
panels, including the 1898 Typhoid Board (leading to the development of the first typhoid 
vaccine), the 1899 Philippine Tropical Disease Boards, and the 1900 Yellow Fever Commission.  
 
Originally housed on the National Mall, in 1910 the Army Medical School began the first of 
three moves, the last of which found it housed at Walter Reed General Hospital, located in 
Washington, DC. It was during the period between the World Wars that the research mission of 
the school (by that time, known as the Army Medical Department Professional Service School) 
truly began to evolve from its roots as an educational institution. More research goals were 
identified and as doctors in training increasingly spent their time in the hospital, the school 
became less and less a hub of graduate medical education. During the Korean War, the Institute 
recognized the importance of research on global infectious diseases, since war could result in 
American troops being deployed to any part of the world; it also expanded its mission to include 
a new Department of Neuropsychiatry. In 1958, the WRAIR Pilot Bioproduction Facility was 
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established, with the express goal of developing and producing experimental vaccines; it 
continues to provide production capabilities for phase I clinical trials. (27) By this time, the 
institute had a truly research-focused mission, and was beginning to expand its efforts to 
establish research sites and partnerships abroad. In 2001, WRAIR moved to its current home in 
Silver Spring, MD, and is now located alongside the Naval Medical Research Center, which was 
founded in 1942 in Bethesda, MD and has been located in Silver Spring since 1999. 
 
The Army also maintains the 750-employee US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Disease (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, MD, where it has operated since its founding in 1956. 
Initially known as the U.S. Army Medical Unit, it first functioned as a center for all forms of 
biodefense research, including work on offensive biological warfare. In 1969, the U.S. mission to 
conduct offensive research was completely discontinued and all biological weapons at the site 
were destroyed.  Simultaneously, the center took on its new name, and USAMRIID has been the 
center of military biological defense research since that time, working on pathogens such as 
Anthrax, Botulism, Plague, Ebola, Marburg, Hantavirus, Lassa Fever, Tularemia, Ricin and 
Staph toxins. Work at USAMRIID has resulted in vaccines for Tularemia, Venezuelan, Eastern 
and Western Equine Encephalitides, Botulinum Toxoid, and Smallpox; work continues on 
additional vaccines, including those for Plague, Hantavirus, Ricin, Burkholderia, Ebola, 
Marburg, Staph Enterotoxin B, and a new Anthrax vaccine. (28, 29) 
 
The Navy maintains its own research efforts through the Naval Medical Research Center 
(NMRC), currently collocated with WRAIR in Silver Spring.  Originally housed on the campus 
of the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, MD, the Center was founded in 1942 and was 
originally known as the Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI). Early research focuses 
included not just Navy-specific subjects, such as dive medicine, but infectious diseases as well—
in 1943, the center was already focusing on preventing typhus and malaria, including the 
effectiveness of improved insect repellents. (30, 31) From its founding, the NMRI took part in 
infectious disease research projects alongside the Army, and the military services are united in 
their infectious disease research efforts by the Military Infectious Diseases Research Program 
(MIDRP), an umbrella organization with some 300 doctoral level scientists employed at one of 
the many military research sites in the United States and abroad. (32) In an expansive report on 
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military research, the Institute of Medicine has proposed that the NMRC and WRAIR programs 
should be integrated, but that has yet to occur. (33) 
 
International Partnerships: U.S. Military Research Overseas 
Although informal military research had been conducted abroad since before the founding of 
formal institutes, beginning during the World War II era the military began to sponsor research 
laboratories in foreign countries, since overseas locations often provided the best opportunities 
for the study of infectious diseases of interest. These foreign labs now represent “the most 
broadly based international facilities of their kind supported by the United States.” (34) The first 
foreign laboratory, started in 1942 as the Navy Medical Research Unit 3 (NAMRU-3), has been 
in continuous operation in Cairo, Egypt since the time of its formal founding in 1946 and 
remains the largest overseas military research facility.2 Originally developed as a partnership 
with the Abbassia Fever Hospital to conduct research as part of the United States Typhus 
Commission, today the research unit focuses on a wide range of infectious disease research, 
including serving as the regional WHO lab for rotavirus and malaria. (35) There is an affiliated 
detachment in Ghana founded in 1996, which initially began as an affiliation with the Navrongo 
Health Research Center in Northern Ghana, and now works with medical centers throughout 
West Africa on investigation of leischmaniasis, influenza, malaria, STDs, and Lassa fever, 
among other diseases. (36, 37) 
 
The Navy also has several smaller foreign labs. NAMRU-6, founded in 1983 and located in Peru, 
is headquartered in Lima and Iquitos and has an additional laboratory facility in Puerto 
Maldonado. The unit works in affiliation with the Peruvian Navy and routinely partners with a 
number of government organizations and universities within the country on dengue research and 
surveillance, malaria, yellow fever, leishmaniasis, Chagas, and enteric diseases. (38) The Navy 
also sponsors two research efforts in Asia. NAMRU-2, first located in Guam during World War 
II, then in Taiwan starting in 1955, has since moved between Manilla (1979), Jakarta (1991), 
Pearl Harbor (2010), and Phnom Penn (2013). Activities in the region focus on drug-resistant 
                                                
2 NAMRU-1, now defunct, was founded in 1934 and operated in Northern California until its closing in 
the 1970s. NAMRU-2, discussed later, was also founded during World War II but has moved several 
times since its founding and did not include a formal laboratory at its opening.  
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malaria and infectious disease surveillance throughout Southeast Asia. (39) The U.S. Naval 
Medical Research Center - Asia (NMRC-A) was established as the center of Asian research in 
2013, with headquarters moving to Singapore from Pearl Harbor. (40) 
 
The Army, through WRAIR, also maintains a number of overseas laboratories. In 1958, the U.S. 
military founded the Army’s first, the Thai Cholera Research Laboratory, renamed the South 
East Asia Treaty Organization Medical Research Laboratory (SMRL) a year later, and the 
Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences (AFRIMS) in 1977. The research institute, 
which is a joint effort between the U.S. and Thai militaries, is run by a Thai military commander 
and an American Army officer under the command of WRAIR and the U.S. Army Medical 
Research and Materiel Command; there are over 300 staff of both nationalities currently working 
at the institute. (41, 42) Although the headquarters of AFRIMS is located in Bangkok, research 
activities are conducted throughout the country and region. A major field station, founded in 
1980, is located Kamphaeng Phet Province (the Kamphaeng-Phet-AFRIMS Virology Research 
Unit, KAVRU). Surveillance for influenza and emerging infectious disease is conducted in eight 
border provinces (surveillance is also a major mission at other Army research labs throughout the 
world) and several other provinces host research projects and clinical trials, including for 
dengue, HIV, scrub typhus, and diarrheal diseases. Outside of Thailand, AFRIMS has additional 
field sites in Bangladesh (studying malaria drug resistance and shigella), Bhutan (studying 
malaria drug resistance), Cambodia (studying diarrheal diseases and malaria), Laos, Maldives 
(studying diarrhea), and Vietnam (studying HIV, plague, and enteric disease). They also have 
more major research facilities in Nepal (Walter Reed/AFRIMS Research Unit Nepal, WARUN), 
founded in 1995, and the Philippines (Philippines-AFRIMS Virology Research Unit, PAVRU), 
established in 2006. (42) 
 
Outside of Asia, WRAIR affiliated labs in Africa conduct substantial research on HIV and 
malaria. The U.S. Army Medical Research Unit Kenya (USAMRU-K), located in Nairobi and 
affiliated with the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI), was founded in 1969, and is 
affiliated with two field stations in Kericho and Kisumu, Kenya. The Institute employs 12 U.S. 
Army members and over 600 Kenyan researchers and support staff. Through 2011, the Institute 
has published over 300 articles. (43) In Uganda, Walter Reed has also maintained a partnership 
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with Makerere University in Kampala to conduct HIV research since 1998. WRAIR also has a 
European research unit, founded in 1977, dedicated to psychiatric and behavioral health research, 
and in the past it had additional units—in Saigon, Vietnam from 1965 to 1970, in Brasilia, Brazil 
from 1973 to 1999 and in Korea from 1988 to 1993.3 
 
Funding for Military Research 
Funding for military research comes from a number of sources. Most directly, the U.S. Army 
Medical Research and Materiel Command funds the efforts of the MIDRP (the collaborative 
body that unites research efforts among the services), and total funds have declined over recent 
decades, from roughly $73 million in 1998 through 2002 (with approximately $40 million for 
vaccines) to $48 million in 2005 and $41 million in 2010 (adjusted for inflation). Of note, HIV 
has its own independent source of funding through the United States Military HIV Research 
Program, which was established in 1986 by Congress (44-46) The MIDRP also receives funds 
through several other government sources, including the Small Business Innovation Research 
Program, Congressional Special Interest funding (which will “sponsor scientifically meritorious 
biomedical research as requested by Congress;” in 2014, it had $500 million appropriated to 
specific research areas, none of which were clearly related to infectious disease research), 
Interagency Agreement funding (such as from the NIH) and funding from industry through 
cooperative agreements related to specific projects (described below). (47) Biological defense 
research, primarily conducted at USAMRIID, had a separate budget of approximately $70 
million in 2010. (48) It should be noted that the military’s funding for research is minute 
compared to other government organizations. As a point of comparison, the National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious Disease, a frequent collaborator with military researchers that also has a 
biodefense mission, had a budget of $4.6 billion in 2014—including over $1.3 billion for 
biodefense specifically, or almost twenty times the budget of USAMRIID, the Army’s designated 
                                                
3 The degree to which overseas military labs are made available to reserachers from other government 
agencies is difficult to quantify, although the military’s extensive overseas network of partners and 
facilities could certainly be useful to these organizations. There are some indications that the largest scale 
programs for malaria and HIV have more inter-agency coordination than for smaller projects, but there 
still appears to be a significant amount of siloing. 
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biodefense research laboratory. (49)4 
 
Public and Private Collaboration: Background on the Development and Licensing Process 
The military's ability to identify a problem and then narrowly focus research efforts along each 
step of the path to a solution has undoubtedly played a part in its research success, even in the 
face of its relatively small personnel and budget allotments. Still, although the military has an 
impressive record of research achievements, including development of numerous vaccines, none 
of its work has been accomplished in a vacuum. Frequently, the complexity of translating basic 
science research into medical technology, as well as the cost and difficulty of clinical trials and 
vaccine manufacturing, has led military researchers to collaborate with other organizations—
some within government, some in the private sector, and some representing non-governmental 
organizations and philanthropic interests. (50) Indeed, the MIDRP not only cites private 
collaborators as an important source of funding, but also recognizes that:  
 
One of MIDRP’s major strengths is the recognition by industry collaborators of its 
neutrality (lack of profit motive) as it pursues its service mission. The trust that this 
engenders facilitates collaborations that could not otherwise be contemplated, 
allowing the sharing of trade secrets and the testing of many promising new 
technologies. (51)  
 
Long before outside collaborations can be formed, though, the military has to prioritize its 
projects and set its research agenda. In the Army, the process of funding a research project 
begins with annual evaluations of research objectives submitted by Army research organizations 
and laboratories. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology 
selects specific projects for identification as Army Science and Technology Objectives (STO), 
and these projects receive priority and funding, sometimes allotted for multiple years. It is 
pertinent to note again that, because of its nature as a Congressionally-directed program, HIV 
research is funded differently than other military research. Approximately 30 of 200 STO 
projects in any given year are medically focused; in addition, some projects with less well-
                                                
4 Admittedly, NIH biodefense research does include an even wider range of pathogens and pursuits than 
the military, including emerging infections such as MERS and influenza and drug-resistant strains of 
infectious diseases (such as TB and S. aureus), as well as programs focused on immunology. 
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defined goals are funded under the Science and Technology Evaluation Program (STEM), and 
may eventually qualify for STO classification. As vaccine research progresses, additional 
analysis is performed to define a project's military necessity. If approved, this analysis, defined 
within an Operational Requirements Document, qualifies a research project for advanced 
development—for vaccines, this generally coincides with Phase I/II clinical trials. (44) 
 
At any point in this process, collaboration with an external organization may be established. 
Often, these relationships are created to gain additional resources or funding from an outside 
source when federal funding is limited; when they are made with a private corporation, they may 
also be the first step in a future agreement to license a developed vaccine for production. Based 
on the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, directors of military research institutes are 
authorized to establish their own relationships with civilian corporations when these 
relationships may be beneficial in furthering research goals. These agreements, known as 
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA), define the extent of research to 
be conducted between the two organizations and the goals of the collaboration. They also outline 
the patents that each party provides upon entering the agreement, as well as providing a 
framework for how future intellectual property development will be treated, although any 
discoveries or innovations that are made within the CRADA agreement will undergo an 
individual negotiation process to determine how intellectual property rights are defined. 
Currently, the MIDRP has over 100 active CRADAs with outside organizations. (51, 52) 
 
When manufacturing of a vaccine technology becomes the next logical consideration, a specific 
licensing partnership is entered, in which a corporation is given rights to “make, use, develop and 
vend the invention throughout the U.S. and in exchange for royalties”.  (53) Known as a patent 
license agreement, such contracts are advantageous to the military because they facilitate 
production of a desirable technology on a scale that will meet the military's needs, since the 
military does not currently maintain large-scale manufacturing capability of its own. In the case 
of vaccines, a corporation typically takes responsibility for gaining FDA licensing approval, 
which also removes a costly burden from the military. However, technology licensing also 
represents a profit opportunity for a partner corporation, which stands to make money from 
military or jointly developed technology—often, simply by selling this technology back to the 
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military or the U.S. government in its final, manufactured form.  
 
Unfortunately, the military-industry arrangement can represent a potential challenge to the 
military if a manufacturer perceives a loss in value from product production, or if no 
manufacturer can be identified at all because of the very limited nature of a given disease. This 
scenario has played out a number of times and has resulted in gaps in production to support both 
large-scale vaccine programs (such as hepatitis E and adenovirus) and more targeted vaccine 
programs (such as Rift Valley fever, along with several others).  (44) Multiple sources, including 
the former director of WRAIR, Phillip Russell, have called this pathway to production into 
question both for its inefficiency for the military and its failure to appropriately value the fact 
that the fruits of military infectious disease research have the potential to benefit low-income 
countries. During a 1984 address to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Tropical 
Medicine and Hygiene, Russell discussed the process: 
 
The development of drugs and vaccines and insecticides has been heavily 
dependent on investment by industry and to a large extent carried out by industrial 
firms…A notable exception has been the drug and vaccine development done or 
underwritten by the U.S. Army where government funds covered the early phases 
of development and subsidized the end-stage industrial development…The heavy 
reliance on industrial investment for development of the products needed in 
tropical medicine is, I believe, a thing of the past. I will not go into the reasons for 
the decline of vaccine production and manufacturing in the United States but it is a 
well recognized problem, and leaves this country with a serious deficiency in the 
ability to undertake development of new products such as malaria vaccines, and 
new viral and bacterial vaccines, especially those needed principally in the 
developing countries. If we are to exploit the potential of our research, we cannot 
rely heavily on industry to make the investments. The profit motive is simply not 
sufficient for many of the potential products needed in the tropical medicine 
field and disincentives, such as product liability, are great. A greater 
responsibility for product development must be borne by the public sector 
through government agencies and foundations.  (54) 
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Nearly 20 years later, the Institute of Medicine performed an extensive analysis of the military 
vaccine program, and came to a very similar conclusion regarding the current vaccine production 
paradigm: 
 
DOD’ s current approach to vaccines originates with the best intentions, involves 
skilled individuals, millions (but not sufficient millions) of dollars, and intricate 
planning. Nevertheless, the committee’ s assessment after hearing from many of 
those involved in the acquisition process, as well as several executives from the 
companies that manufacture vaccines, is that the current vaccine acquisition 
process has limitations that make the path from basic research to 
procurement and use of vaccines both inefficient financially and cumbersome. 
These limitations result in occasional outright failure (as in the case of the loss 
of the adenovirus vaccines) and unacceptable delays (in the case of the 
anthrax vaccine) in vaccine acquisition. The lack of vaccines when and where 
they are needed risks the success of future military operations and the health of 
personnel and potentially places national security in jeopardy. (44)5 
 
The military’s model of using its limited funding to focus on basic science and translation (and 
even, frequently, to help with if not fund major clinical trials) has allowed the military to be 
prolific in its output, but it has not allowed the most widespread and useful application of 
technology in every case. Unfortunately, although this problem has been recognized for decades, 
little has changed, perhaps because the task of recreating the system and processes of military 
research and its cumbersome bureaucracy is not the area of expertise of most people involved in 
it, all of whom have a huge task simply to solve the scientific questions that some of the world’s 
most challenging diseases present. 
 
                                                
5 The “loss” of the adenovirus vaccine refers to the 12 year period between 1996 and 2011 when an 
adenovirus vaccine, licensed for use in the military and given to all incoming recruits beginning in 1980, 
lost its manufacturing contract. During the intervening period, no vaccine was produced and by 1999 the 
vaccine was completely unavailable, resulting in the deaths of several recruits. The military ultimately 
established a relationship with a new industry partner and paid $100 million for the construction of a new 




I open with the story of the hepatitis A vaccine for several reasons. The military played a 
significant role in every step of vaccine development, from the basic science of isolating and 
propagating the virus to creating protoypes vaccines to conducting clinical trials abroad. It also 
worked in parallel and partnership with two pharmaceutical companies, the Thai government, 
and the NIH, demonstrating the diverse range of partners needed to bring a vaccine project to 
completion. The vaccine became a major commercial product in the United States and Europe 
but was never widely introduced in Thailand, where it was tested, despite the fact that even the 
military scientists most closely involved in developing the hepatitis A vaccine stated their 
support for this outcome. This case thus highlights perhaps the clearest example of disparity in 
the outcomes of military research, while also painting a picture of the industry, government, and 
international milieu in which military vaccine research is conducted. 
 
The Natural History of Hepatitis A: A Unique Challenge 
As a public health problem, hepatitis A presents a unique conundrum that drove the need for a 
vaccine. Transmitted via the fecal-oral route, it is highly prevalent in areas with poor sanitation 
and contaminated water supplies—throughout Africa, for example, nearly 100% of the 
population demonstrates immunity by young adulthood, with over half of children having 
immunity by the age of 4. In high incidence areas such as Africa, the reported incidence of 
clinical illness may be as high as 150/100,000 (55, 56) Fortunately, unlike other water-borne 
infections, hepatitis A presents with no symptoms in some 70% of children and generally only 
mild symptoms in the remainder. (57) This is not true of adults without prior exposure, however, 
who are far more likely to become symptomatic on their first exposure to the disease—70% will 
become jaundiced, for example. Fortunately, long-term sequelae are rare and chronic hepatitis 
does not seem to result as it does following infection with other forms of hepatitis. (58) 
Nonetheless, hepatitis A in adults is far from benign, and up to 22% of infected adults require 
hospitalization for significant symptoms including acute liver failure, with an average length of 
stay of roughly 7 days. (59) 
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Because of its close relationship to water and sanitation quality, the epidemiology of hepatitis A 
changes with improving infrastructure. In the 1970s in the United States, roughly 25% of 
teenagers and half of young adults had developed antibodies to the disease, but rates of 
childhood infection and immunity fell quickly thereafter, virtually bottoming out by the time that 
childhood vaccination was introduced in the 1990s.  (55) Through the 1990s, some 270,000 
cases per year were estimated in the United States; by 2004, 5 years after the introduction of 
vaccination, that number had dropped to under 56,000 annually, and to 21,000 by 2009. (60) The 
military, which implemented hepatitis A vaccination in 1995, also saw a decline in cases, with 
hospitalizations as high as 4.0/100,000 person years-years in 1991 dropping to below 1.0 in 1997 
and below 0.5 in 2001 and beyond. (61) 
 
Prior to the introduction of vaccination, declining pediatric cases of hepatitis A presented a 
unique challenge for individuals and groups traveling from the United States to higher 
prevalence areas—travelers and the military in particular—who had no immunity from 
childhood and were thus at risk of contracting a more significant adult infection. Although the 
disease rarely results in significant mortality or long-term sequelae, the average adult patient 
misses thirty days of work in addition to the risk of hospitalization previously noted. In 1997, 
63,500 cases of hepatitis A in the United States were estimated to cost $500 million in lost work 
time and medical care; internationally, with 1.4 million cases estimated annually, that cost is 
estimated to be as high as $3 billion. (62) The interest in preventing this sort of debility on a 
vacation, business trip, or military mission was understandable, and drove research into a 
vaccine. In addition, although mortality has been historically noted to be low, in patients over 50, 
the mortality rate in the United States is estimated at 27/1000. (63) Worldwide, 102,000 deaths 
were attributable to acute hepatitis A in 2010—approximately 1/3 of total hepatitis deaths. (64) 
 
As was observed in the United States, as economic conditions improve in hepatitis A endemic 
areas, the prevalence of disease drops, leaving a susceptible adult population. Thailand, a long-
time medical partner of the U.S. military and the location of the hepatitis A vaccine trial that will 
be described later, is a key example of this transition; it was also the location of the clinical trial 
that proved the efficacy of the military-developed hepatitis A vaccine. A middle-income country, 
the epidemiology of hepatitis A in Thailand has changed significantly over the past 30-40 
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decades. In the 1970s, exposure to the disease reflected the current experience of African 
nations—over half of children had been exposed and developed antibodies by age 10, and by age 
30, nearly 100% of the population was immune. This rate of infection was consistent through the 
1980s, before beginning to slow in the 1990s, with only a third of 20-somethings showing 
immunity by that decade. By the 2000s, fewer than 5% of Thai children and 25% of Thai young 
adults had been exposed to the disease, with rural numbers somewhat higher. (55) A 2007 study 
of Thai medical and nursing students showed a 15.3% exposure rate; a similar 2009 study of 
Thai Army nursing students returned even lower numbers, showing that of 381 students 
averaging 20 years of age, only 8.9% had anti-HAV antibodies, indicating past exposure. (65, 
66) The changing epidemiology of the disease has recently opened the Thai population up to the 
experience of increasing adult infection, with its higher rates of clinically significant disease, and 
has increased the number of notable outbreaks occurring throughout the country. 
 
Hepatitis A in Military History 
Jaundice, understood as a disease synonymous with undifferentiated viral hepatitis and not just 
as the clinic sign it now refers to, has long-posed an infectious threat to campaigning militaries.  
In the United States, an outbreak of jaundice was first recorded in conjunction with military 
history, as a player in the War of 1812. (67) The Civil War resulted in an estimated 20,000-
70,000 cases of jaundice due to hepatitis. (68) American forces were relatively unscathed in 
World War I, but this apparent blessing was ultimately blamed for the failure of the military to 
prepare appropriately for the threat of jaundice during World War II, during which 200,000 cases 
were recorded among American forces—numbers “so large as to influence the strategy of the 
war.” (69) The Mediterranean theater was perhaps most significantly affected, with a peak 
incidence in U.S. forces of over 18,000 in 1943; during the period of 1943-1945, viral hepatitis 
was the most disabling infectious disease in the Mediterranean and North African theaters. 
German forces suffered much more significantly, with millions of cases reported in soldiers over 
the course of the conflict. (68)   
 
Until the 1940s, the jaundice that affected military units was known only as “epidemic jaundice,” 
in contrast to serum jaundice (now known as hepatitis B), which was recognized to be an 
independent disease process. In 1942, Dr. F. O. McCallum coined the term “viral hepatitis, type 
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A,” and this subsequently became the preferred term. It was during this time, too, that interest 
began to mount for identifying the causative agent of jaundice, although efforts to do so were not 
particularly fruitful in the early period. By the mid-1950s, attempts to propagate the vaccine in a 
wide array of animals and cell cultures had been tried and had failed, and research efforts 
through the subsequent decades were no luckier. (70) 
 
Even as basic science research into hepatitis A floundered, the practicalities of protecting troops 
from it were being addressed independently. The lessons of World War II were not forgotten in 
subsequent conflicts, but in the absence of a vaccine, protection for deploying troops had to be 
established through other methods. Beginning in 1964 and continuing through the Vietnam War 
and subsequently during the Gulf War, passive immunity was established in deploying troops 
through the use of immune globulin. A working group at the University of Pennsylvania 
established under the Army Epidemiological Board during the Second World War first 
demonstrated the protective effects of this method; trials of Ig had also been conducted in the 
field during military campaigning in Italy, 1944-1945. (71) When applied on a large scale in 
future conflicts, however, the approach was not without its challenges. In Vietnam, Ig proved 
less than fully efficacious, with some research questioning whether it affected disease occurrence 
whatsoever. Due to limited supplies, various stipulations had to be established for which forces 
would receive it. And it was logistically challenging to administer, as it required periodic re-
dosing in order to maintain protection. Despite its use in Vietnam, over 12,000 cases of hepatitis 
A occurred during the war, resulting in nearly 1000 years worth of work-days lost—roughly one 
month of convalescent time per sick soldier. (72) During the Gulf War, the large force and rapid 
deployment again demonstrated the significant logistical challenge of obtaining sufficient Ig for 
hundreds of thousands of deploying troops.  (21) Indeed, the entire U.S. supply was depleted by 
the need to treat half a million troops with Ig, further reinforcing the military’s need for a safe 
and effective vaccine—which, incidentally, had been developed and was undergoing testing at 
that time. 
 
The military medical community was under no illusion that IgG was a long-term solution to the 
problem of hepatitis A, but into the 1970s, there was no hope that any other solution was 
imminent either. In a 1975 presentation to the Annual Meeting of the Society of Medical 
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Consultants to the Armed Forces, Saul Krugman lamented the lack of progress in the area. Dr. 
Krugman, who remains well known for his research on the hepatitides and was awarded the 
Lasker Prizer for his work on hepatitis B, received extensive military funding for his work on 
hepatitis. Of note, he has also been subjected to criticism for the ethics of his research methods, 
including experimentation on disabled children. (73, 74) It was not until a few years after his 
speech, in 1979, that scientists at Merck successfully propagated the virus in cell culture; a few 
years later, WRAIR researchers propagated the virus in primate cells, which became the 
stepping-stone for their development of the first hepatitis A vaccine. (75) 
 
Towards an Effective Vaccine 
Military researchers were not the only ones who recognized the utility of developing an effective 
vaccine—numerous other research groups were working toward a hepatitis vaccine in parallel 
with WRAIR, as evidenced by Merck’s success in propagating the virus. In 1979, at roughly the 
same time as WRAIR’s success in propagating the hepatitis A virus, Merck proved the efficacy 
of a hepatitis vaccine in marmoset cell cultures from which they had previously propagated the 
virus. (76) Indicative of the pervasive influence of the military in developing vaccine researchers 
was the fact that the group was led by Dr. Maurice Hilleman, a pioneer in the field of vaccine 
development who spent a decade working at WRAIR in the 1940-1950s before being recruited to 
Merck; this pattern of working for the military before transitioning to industry was not 
uncommon and would be repeated by numerous researchers over following years. In 1986, 
WRAIR validated their own vaccine in monkeys, using a cell line that had good evidence for use 
in producing human vaccines, and a CRADA with SmithKline Beecham came the following 
year. (75) This primate vaccine used the HM175 hepatitis A strain cultured in MRC5 human 
diploid cells. Based on its efficacy in monkeys and guinea pigs, researchers gained 
investigational new drug (IND) approval and the vaccine was tested in 1986 in a group of eight 
human volunteers at WRAIR, the first such trial in humans. Despite low amounts of antigen in 
the vaccine, all volunteers developed neutralizing antibodies after four doses and these remained 
detectable for years. The vaccine subsequently underwent stage I clinical trials in 1988 on an 
Army base in Fort Lewis, Washington with good results. (21, 77) Researchers at the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease were simultaneously working on vaccine 
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development, and developed their own CRADAs with Smithkline for a hepatitis A vaccine, 
vaccine process, and several other developments, including isolation of the HM-175 cell line.  
 
At the time, SmithKline was also working to develop its own vaccine from a Swiss hepatitis 
strain; ultimately, though, they found that the HM175 strain propagated and used for vaccine 
development at WRAIR and the NIH was more effective, and they dropped their own research 
efforts. (78, 79) Ultimately, WRAIR’s early vaccine would serve as a prototype for Smithkline’s 
Havrix vaccine against hepatitis A; Smithkline developed a final version with more antigen and 
an adjuvant to increase the vaccine’s effectiveness. (80-82) WRAIR continued to participate in 
clinical testing of the vaccine, and entered a second CRADA with Smithkline Beecham in 1991. 
Merck was working simultaneously to test its own hepatitis vaccine and was slightly further 
along in the process; in 1991 it completed a trial in an endemic population of just over 1000 
children in New York, demonstrating that nearly 100% developed antibodies to hepatitis A 
within a few weeks of vaccine administration. (83) Despite Merck’s head start through the 
development and testing process, the SmithKline vaccine would still be the first to gain FDA 
approval. 
 
Testing of the Smithkline hepatitis A vaccine began in Thailand that year, during what was 
incidentally the natural transition period of the illness from highly prevalent among Thai children 
to increasingly uncommon. Smithkline had initially lobbied for a U.S. trial of the vaccine; 
however, military researchers proposed a trial in Thailand. The military had a robust, decades-
old partnership with Thai medical researchers at Kamphaeng Phet Province Hospital (KPP) via 
the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences located in Bangkok, had recently 
completed a Japanese Encephalitis vaccine trial with this group, and had also established that 
Thai children had falling but nonetheless notable rates of hepatitis A—a 1.1% annual infection 
rate in the region where the trial was conducted—making it an ideal location to test a vaccine.  
(84)  
 
The 1991 Thai trial was a double-blind, randomized controlled trial involving 40,119 children 
(aged 1-16 years) in the Kamphaeng Phet province, some 200 miles north of Bangkok. Control 
participants received a hepatitis B vaccine; all patients received a total of 3 doses of vaccine. 17 
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months after the start of the trial, a crossover was undertaken, with all participants ultimately 
receiving both hepatitis A and B vaccines. The results were notable: protective levels of 
antibodies to hepatitis A were established in 94%, 94%, and 99% of participants at 8, 12, and 17 
months after the first vaccine dose. Among all participants, 40 cases of hepatitis A occurred 
during the trial—38 among controls, and 2 among vaccine recipients (both of which were 
exceedingly mild compared to control cases when measured by illness duration, clinical 
presentation, and peak ALT). Adverse effects (compared to the hepatitis B control) included 
local tenderness/redness/swelling, headache, disturbed sleep and fever; no serious adverse effects 
were observed. The results of the trial were considered a success, and were published in JAMA 
in May 1994. (85) This achievement represented the culmination of well over a decade of 
concerted effort by military, SmithKline and NIH scientists. The military, for its part, had been 
the first to propagate the virus in primate cell culture; developed the primate vaccine that would 
serve as a model for the human product developed with SmithKline; conducted the first human 















                                




Approval for Americans 
The GSK Havrix vaccine, as it came to be known commercially, was approved by the FDA in 
1995 for adults and children two and older; approval for a Merck developed hepatitis A vaccine, 
Vaqta, followed the next year. In the first few years following approval, the CDC and American 
College of Physicians recommended vaccination for travelers, high risk patients (homosexual 
men, IV drug users, patients with liver disease, and those at occupational risk), and children 
living in areas of the U.S. with high rates of infection—at the time, significant regional 
differences existed in infection rates, with Native American and hispanic populations 
significantly more at risk of infection, and incidence rates ranging from 0-4/100,000 along the 
East Coast to >20/100,000 along the Pacific Coast and in the Southwest.   
 
Over time, the definition of regions at high risk broadened—an initial recommendation for 
vaccination of children in areas with incidence of 700-1000/100,000 changed to a 
recommendation for vaccination in areas with more than 20/100,000 cases (encompassing 11 
states, including populous California), and a recommendation to consider vaccination in states 
exceeding the national average of 10/100,000 (an additional 6 states, including Texas). (68) By 
2004, a survey of 2-3 year olds demonstrated 54% vaccination in children living in high-
incidence states. (87) In 2006, following the approval of Havrix for babies older than 12 months 
(approval had previously begun at 24 months) the CDC adjusted its recommendation to two 
doses of the hepatitis A vaccine for all children in the country—the first given at 12-23 months 
of age, the second 6-18 months later. (87, 88) 
 
In Thailand, the story was different. Almost a decade after the completion of the Thai trial that 
led to Havrix approval in America, the first major cost-effectiveness analysis of vaccination in 
Thailand was published; prior to this, there appears to be no documentation of a formal 
consideration of including hepatitis A on the Thai vaccine schedule. This 2002 analysis 
conducted by researchers at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok found that hepatitis A 
vaccination would not to be a cost effective public health intervention in Thailand. Basing their 
analysis on a cost of 1840 baht for the two dose series (approximately $56.00 in 2014, essentially 
identical to the cost of the vaccination in the U.S.A.), they found that the vaccine series would 
have to cost less than 586 baht ($18) for it to be cost effective to vaccinate all children. (89) 
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Now, over a decade later, the vaccine is still not part of the Thai pediatric vaccination schedule, 
although it is recommended on the expanded schedule, meaning that those with private insurance 
may receive it. (90) Interestingly in 2004, around the same time as the first cost-effectiveness 
analysis was conducted, hepatitis B vaccination was added to the Thai National Vaccine 
schedule. At the time, TWINRIX, a combined vaccine for hepatitis A and B made by GSK, had 
been FDA approved for several years, but this was apparently not considered  an option for 
Thailand, almost certainly because of price. In addition, Thailand, in conjunction with Sanofi-
Pasteur, was producing a hepatitis B vaccine under the name of Euvax for several years by the 
time it was added to the national schedule; Sanofi did not have any product equivalent to 
TWINRIX. (91, 92) Had GSK been Thailand’s production partner, it is possible that more 
comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis would have been conducted and a case built for using 
the combined vaccine in the Thai market. 
 
Disease Disparities 
The Thai decision regarding hepatitis A vaccination is in keeping with the WHO policy, which 
provides strong support for vaccination in countries where its use is cost-effective. In its position 
paper on the hepatitis A vaccination, the World Health Organization articulates the key fact of 
hepatitis A infection, which are directly applicable to the Thai experience: 
 
In most middle-income regions there is a mix of intermediate and low prevalence 
and here, a substantial proportion of adolescents and adults are susceptible. HAV 
infection in these age groups is associated with a higher rate of severe clinical 
manifestations and hence, transition from high to intermediate endemicity may 
result in increased incidence of clinically significant disease and mortality from 
hepatitis A. (93)  
 
Their position on vaccination is strongly supportive of the use of vaccination, and they state that, 
if indicated on the basis of cost-effectiveness, it should be incorporated into national vaccine 
schedules. They additionally include the vaccination on their list of essential medications. (94) 
Interestingly, in 1991, the lead author of the 1994 Thai hepatitis A clinical trial—Dr. Bruce 
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Innis, an AFRIMS researcher who now works for GSK—published another paper, making a 
similar statement on behalf of the Thai people: 
 
Thailand is undergoing a profound economic transition. With increasing 
prosperity, it is experiencing lower rates of hepatitis A in its largest urban areas, 
the focus of much of its phenomenal growth. There also seems to be a decrease in 
hepatitis A transmutation within many rural communities…what is worrisome 
about this trend is that a falling rate of childhood hepatitis A infection places the 
population at a greater risk of more severe infection later in life, when the 
economic consequences of illness are more profound…uniform economic 
development is a long-term solution to this problem. However, hepatitis A 
immunization may have an important role as well. Progress in vaccine 
development has been steady. Both live attenuated and inactivated hepatitis 
vaccines are awaiting or are under evaluation in volunteers….Development of a 
safe, effective, inexpensive vaccine for hepatitis A prevention should prompt 
a reevaluation of immunization priorities for schoolchildren, adolescents, and 
young adults for both types of hepatitis.  (84) 
 
A 1998 review of declining hepatitis A prevalence in southeast Asia drew a similar conclusion, 
saying “Vaccination could prove to be a public health measure of considerable benefit for SE 
Asian countries experiencing improved age-related HAV seroprevalence patterns in parallel with 
socioeconomic development.” (95) 
 
As the WHO makes clear, cost-effectiveness is essential to establishing the utility of vaccination 
in any population; however, it is clear that not all cost-effectiveness analyses are created equal. 
As policy recommendations for vaccination in the United States have changed, multiple studies 
have evaluated the cost-effectiveness of vaccinating the American population—first high risk 
group (1995), than regional risk areas (1999), then all babies (2005). Analysis completed in 
2006, following the expansion of U.S. vaccination to include all children, determined that routine 
vaccination of all American children at age 1 would cost $28,000 per quality-adjusted life year—
deemed by the authors to be an appropriate amount consistent with other common public health 
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interventions, such as HIV screening in the general population ($42,000 per QALY), and below 
the threshold of $50,000 per QALY commonly used in the United States. (96, 97)  
 
Even beyond the fact that the U.S. and Thailand have different QALY thresholds based on their 
differing GDPs, the differences between the Thai and American analyses are significant, and 
raise questions about disparities in even the most basic preventative health measures. The Thai 
analysis assumed incidence of disease far above what had been previously deemed inappropriate 
in the U.S. under the regional vaccination policy—from 45/100,000 for adults to 76/100,000 for 
adolescents—as well as a fulminant hepatitis rate of 0.1% in adults. In the United States, regional 
vaccination had been implanted initially in areas with over 20/100,000 cases per year, and later 
in areas over 10/100,000 cases. The Thai analysis also accounted for work-day/productivity 
loss—one of the largest costs in the U.S. cost-effectiveness trial—in a much narrower sense than 
U.S. cost effectiveness analysis, including only days spent in the hospital and one day for 
vaccination in the calculations. For comparison purposes, the U.S. analysis estimated extensive 
productivity losses amounting to $37,000,000—almost identical to the total cost of medical care 
for hepatitis A patients. For a disease that often requires several weeks to a month of 
convalescence, productivity cost is certainly not an inconsequential cost to consider. (89) In 
addition, the American analysis included the cost of 20 liver transplants resulting from fulminant 
hepatic failure, at an average cost of $575,000 each. (98) Although liver transplantation is 
performed in Thailand, its cost was not included in the cost-effectiveness analysis. Finally, the 
Thai study did not assess QALYs, but instead did a pure cost-effectiveness analysis—whether 
universal or targeted vaccination would be cheaper than the costs of disease. One study that 
analyzed the cost of hepatitis A outbreaks in developed countries found that the economic impact 
of such outbreaks can be significant, are often due to indirect costs, and that “for vaccination 
strategies against infections that occur predominantly in outbreak situations, incorrect estimation 
of these costs could lead to misleading cost effectiveness.” (99) 
 
An Ethical Dilemma 
Beyond an assessment of whether cost-effectiveness was appropriately assessed in the Thai 
setting, there remain significant ethical questions related to the lack of Thai access to a 
technology they helped to develop. The ethics of clinical trials, including those of this trial 
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specifically, have been explored before. Two principles—“reasonable availability” and “fair 
benefits”—are particularly cogent in this case as they define how populations that participate in 
trials should be treated. In a 2004 report by the Hastings Center, the Havrix trial is described as 
an example of a “paradigmatic case” of an exploitative trial on the ground that it was conducted 
“without assurance from research sponsors or others that the intervention being evaluated will be 
made ‘reasonably available’ to the population of the host country after the trial.” They do 
counter with the idea that substantial benefits were received (the ‘fair benefits’ framework) from 
the conduct of the trial itself, including well over 40,000 participants and researchers receiving 
the hepatitis A and hepatitis B vaccines, as well as receipt of other durable equipment and 
training. Nonetheless, there were many within Thailand (and beyond) who opposed the trial and 
did not see the benefits as appropriate (although unlike the example of hepatitis E will show, this 
opposition did not seem to relate directly to the involvement of the U.S. military). (100) 
 
The ethical debate may also extend to the fact that the Thai trial was conducted under the 
auspices of an enduring partnership between U.S. and Thai researchers at KPP and AFRMIS. 
The mission of AFRIMS is “medical research, disease surveillance and development and 
evaluation of medical products for militarily important infectious and tropical infectious 
diseases.” While the Thai military undoubtedly views the partnership as a beneficial one, the 
obligation of the more powerful party to respect the best interests of the host nation should not be 
overlooked. In 1959, when the partnership was first proposed, then Thai King Bhumibol was 
savvy to this issue. Responding to Dr. Joseph Smadel, the chief of the American team visiting 
Thailand to negotiate the start of the collaboration, the King asked “Yes, Dr. Smadel, but how 
will the research help my people?” (101) 
 
Even from a pragmatic standpoint, creating a precedent of medical testing on the Thai people 
without a strong track record of the fruits of that research reaching the larger population is 
probably unwise. As the case of hepatitis E will demonstrate, host populations are far from naïve 
about the priorities of foreign researchers. In the case of a long-term partnership (and one where 
the same region is called upon to repeatedly participate in clinical trials, as Kampaeng Phet has 
been), it seems both ethically appropriate and in the self-interest of the U.S. military to build 
good will with their host—in the case of hepatitis A, this might include supporting appropriate 
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cost-effectiveness analysis or making a strong case for their commercial partner to provide the 
vaccine at a reduced cost.  
 
Populations and Profits 
A final consideration in the ethical analysis of Thai access to the hepatitis vaccine is the issue of 
pharmaceutical profits resultant from the trial. This would be an issue in any scenario, but is 
made more pertinent by the fact that the technology was largely developed and testing facilitated 
by the U.S. government, ultimately at the taxpayer’s expense.  It is true that vaccines have not 
historically been the biggest profit-producers for the pharmaceutical industry; they are also 
perceived as risky, and are increasingly the target of naysayers who blame them for autism and 
other ills (despite a clear lack of evidence). Indeed, regarding the hepatitis A vaccine, “doubts 
over the size of the market seemed to plague their [Merck and SmithKline hepatitis A vaccine] 
development program” up to the time that phase 3 clinical trials were about to commence.  (81) 
Certainly, compared to “blockbuster” drugs such as Lipitor, revenue for which topped $12 
billion in 2005, the WHO’s estimate of $1 billion in annual sales for GSK’s hepatitis vaccines (A 
and B) is relatively paltry. (102) 
 
Vaccines are nonetheless not inconsequential earners, particularly if they become part of 
standard vaccine schedules. Some, including the Economist, have gone so far as to suggest that  
“a renaissance” is underway in terms of vaccine profitability and attention from pharmaceutical 
companies. (103) The United States hepatitis A vaccination program provides an example of 
likely sales for that vaccine. In 2013, 3,957,577 babies were born in the U.S.A.; if all received 
vaccination with the hepatitis A vaccine at the price of $29.74 per dose, as recommended, the 
profit would amount to over $227,000,000 for that annual cohort of babies. (104) However, we 
must assume lower profits based on some children not receiving the vaccine, and many others 
receiving it at the discounted CDC price. On the other hand, some babies undoubtedly receive 
the Twinrix vaccine, which combines inoculation for hepatitis A and B at a price higher than 
receiving the vaccines individually—$121.59 for five shots (two hepatitis A, three hepatitis B) 
versus $277.50 for three shots (the combined Twinrix vaccine). Plus, children internationally 
also receive GSK’s hepatitis A vaccine, which has been approved in Europe since 1993. And 
adults—for whom the vaccine costs more than double the pediatric price—continue to receive 
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the vaccine, primarily for travel. Based on this, the WHO’s assessment of $1 billion sales 
annually for GSK’s hepatitis vaccines seems not far off the mark. This figure represents a small 
but not inconsequential fraction of GSK’s 2013 sales—$26.51 billion. (105) 
 
The research-stunting effect of placing restrictions on industry is often cited as an argument for 
allowing large corporate profits, and it probably also accounts in part for why the military has 
historically not acted to protect the interests of partner governments; conflicts of interest between 
the military, government and industry are perhaps also a significant player, although measuring 
them is understandably difficult. Indeed, the military may be hesitant to place stipulations on 
agreements with private industry for fear of driving them away from a potential agreement—the 
government is well aware of the importance of market forces and profit potential in attracting 
corporate partnerships. Nonetheless, in an extensive report on vaccine acquisition by the U.S. 
military, the Institute of Medicine acknowledged the significance of military research in global 
health: 
 
Of note are instances in which a vaccine developed by the Army might have 
international use that is greater than its direct use to the DOD (e.g., Rift Valley 
fever)…Many of the vaccines developed to protect deployed U.S. forces may 
also be of benefit to the world’s poorest populations, perhaps compelling 
DOD interest in a wider range of vaccine development efforts than might be 
dictated by market forces alone. The committee observes that, overall, the 
availability of a vaccine for military use is subject to many complex and 
changeable interests within—and external to—DOD. (44) 
 
Conclusion 
Currently, the hepatitis A vaccine is approved and available in Thailand, although its use is 
limited primarily to controlling outbreaks and to those with private health coverage, and even in 
these instances its use is far from pervasive. Since the approval of the hepatitis A vaccine in the 
U.S.A. in 1995, numerous outbreaks caused by contaminated food or water have been noted in 
Thailand, many of them among adults. One paper analyzing the molecular characteristics of 
hepatitis A in Thailand identified 11 outbreaks between 2001 and 2005. (106) A large outbreak 
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occurred in Northern Thailand in the summer of 2012, along the border with Laos, resulting in 
1600 hospital visits and some 500 hospitalizations. The authors of a paper analyzing the outbreak 
noted that, “Hepatitis A virus vaccine was not routinely given to the community during the 
outbreak owing to limited budget but offered as one of the choices for preventive measures.” 
They went on to point out the proven utility of universal vaccination in other middle-income 
countries, and to argue for its utility in both pre- and post- exposure prophylaxis, ultimately 
concluding that “A routine hepatitis A vaccination program should be adopted and incorporated 
into the national program to prevent large-scale outbreaks.” (107) 
 
The story of hepatitis A shows the military’s vaccine development mechanisms in a mixed light. 
It is clearly a resounding and impressive success in some ways, particularly as a clinical testing 
achievement—the military conducted the first human vaccine trial and, independently and in 
collaboration with the Thai government, the subsequent trials for the SmithKline vaccine. On the 
other hand, the fact that the vaccine remains largely unused by the country in which it was tested 
and that this injustice is recognized by those most familiar with the disease and yet no 
improvement in Thai access has been made over 20 years is disheartening and reflects an 
example of the lack of a thoughtful process for supported our research partners and military 





Although it shares a name with hepatitis A, hepatitis E is like a younger sibling—recognized as a 
distinct clinical entity later, given less attention and research support. The military’s involvement 
was more focused, with some contributions in the early, basic science stages, but the most 
substantial support coming from the military’s conduct of clinical trials—the area in which it had 
been arguably the most successful in developing hepatitis A. In the case of hepatitis E, trials 
were undertaken in Nepal, but were marred by local conflict and ethical debate, and this 
foreshadowed later ethical concerns about access to the vaccine. Unfortunately hepatitis E 
represents perhaps the largest failure along diseases of military focus—despite time and money 
invested that resulted in an effective vaccine, it never completed development or reached a single 
customer. The world has only recently gained access to a hepatitis E vaccine, thanks to 
independent Chinese research efforts, which resulted in an approved vaccine in 2010. It remains 
to be seen how widely this vaccine will be made available in low-income countries, like Nepal, 
where it is most needed. 
 
A Disease Without a Name: Identifying Hepatitis E and its Scope 
In 1980, a young physician from India published the results of two years of work in Kashmir, 
India, suggesting that an epidemic of jaundice in that region over the period may be the result of 
a novel form of hepatitis. The idea of a non-A, non-B form of hepatitis had been proposed 5 
years earlier, based on observations of blood transfusion recipients, hemophiliacs receiving 
factor VIII and dialysis patients, subsets of whom had developed hepatitis. But Mohammed 
Khuroo recognized that the epidemic he was investigating was different than the blood-borne 
disease that would ultimately be called hepatitis C. Clearly waterborne, the illness Khuroo 
observed affected mostly young, healthy adults, and the Kashmir epidemic resulted in 52,000 
cases and 1,700 deaths. Epidemic wasn’t a common presentation for hepatitis A or B, nor was 
Khuroo’s finding when he analyzed serum and stool from cases, all of which lacked the typical 
serology markings to show they had been infected with either hepatitis A or B. (109, 110)  
 
Nearly simultaneously, an American researcher from the NIH had come to the same conclusion 
about waterborne epidemics of non-A, non-B hepatitis. His work was based on examination of 
samples collected from a 1950s outbreak of jaundice in New Delhi in which 35,000 patients had 
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been sickened. At the time of the epidemic, doctors had assumed this outbreak was caused by 
hepatitis A—it was clearly a waterborne pathogen, and despite the fact that hepatitis A rarely 
caused large outbreaks in endemic areas, no better explanation could be found. Some proposed 
that the hepatitis A immunity victims had acquired from childhood was beginning to fade, 
opening them to increased infection risk in young adulthood. (111) The hepatitis A story stood 
for decades, as hepatitis A and B were the only known forms of the disease until the 1980s. But 
upon examination of samples decades after the outbreak, researchers in India and at the NIH 
discovered, like Khuroo, that serum samples from affected patients had no evidence of acute 
hepatitis A or B infection. They also noted different characteristics of this form of hepatitis, 





















Figure 2: Virus-like particles, obtained from the stool of Dr. Balayan, observed under electron microscopy in 
1983—the first visualization of hepatitis E. (113) 
 
In 1983, a Soviet researcher by the name of Dr. Mikhail Balayan infected a volunteer (reportedly 
himself) with virus particles from stool of a group of patients suspected of having non-A, non-B 
hepatitis. Dr. Balayan had a documented history of hepatitis A infection and antibodies, but 
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nonetheless became clinically ill 36 days after ingestion of the virus, within the normal 3-8 week 
incubation period. Through this process, he was able not only to collect large amounts of virus, 
but also to identify viral particles in his own stool using electron microscopy. (113) In 1987, an 
outbreak of jaundice in a military college in Sargodha, Pakistan, led to the involvement of 
researchers from WRAIR, which was able to prove that the new virus, now known as Hepatitis 
E, was involved in the outbreak. (114, 115) This relationship presumably developed via the 
Pakistan-U.S. Laboratory for Seroepidemiology, located at the Army Medical College and 
Hospital in Rawalpindi. At that time (and despite Dr. Balayan’s ambitious work), the pattern of 
hepatitis E excretion from stool had not been well established, and even when viral particles 
were obtained, correlating them with a recent infection was challenging. (110, 114) For this 
reason, WRAIR’s formal connection of hepatitis E with an ongoing outbreak was a significant 
milestone in research. Indeed, Mohammed Khuroo, the original author describing the new 
hepatitis, later described the period from 1983 to 1990 as “the most frustrating long 7 year halt in 
the story of hepatitis E” because of the significant challenges associated with isolating the 
elusive hepatitis E from stool. In 1987, epidemiological studies showed that non-A, non-B 
hepatitis was estimated to cause three-quarters of all cases of acute hepatitis in Pakistan. 
Simulatneously, Mrigendra Srestha, chief medical officer at the Walter Reed AFRIMS Research 
Unit (WARUN) located in Kathmandu, Nepal, identified the virus on liver necroscopy, and the 
military’s involvement in hepatitis E research was solidified. (116, 117) The Army formally 
established a field laboratory in Kathmandu in 1995, in affiliation with AFRIMS. 
  
By the early 1990s, “hepatitis E” was coming of age. Now recognized as a distinct clinical entity, 
it was being increasingly written about in the medical literature and increasingly appreciated as a 
cause of epidemic illness in countries without widespread access to clean water. As hepatitis E 
grew in the literature—from one article calling it by name in 1989 to 20 in 1990 to over 300 in 
2014—recognition of its clinical significance also grew. Since its identification, the disease has 
since been recognized as the far-and-away leading cause of jaundice in South Asia. It is endemic 
throughout not just Pakistan and Nepal, where early research was conducted, but through much 
of Asia and Africa as well, and is estimated to sicken 14-20 million people per year worldwide, 
resulting in anywhere from 56,000-300,000 deaths—many of them pregnant women, in whom 
the death rate is as high as 25%. (116) It also causes 5200 stillbirths annually. (86) Its prevalence 
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in developed countries is just beginning to be elucidated, with studies in Germany suggesting 
that some 16% of the adult population has been exposed; studies in the United States have 
confirmed similarly high rates of anti-HEV antibodies in the population. (118, 119) Since the 
vast majority of clinical infections are asymptomatic, it is easy to under-diagnose the disease, 
particularly in areas where epidemics are uncommon. However, there is increasing evidence that 
immunocompromised patients who are exposed to the virus are at risk of developing chronic 
hepatitis as a result—a significantly different outcome than the old conventional wisdom that 
hepatitis E was generally self-limited. This finding makes hepatitis E a disease of potentially 
greater import in developed nations than was once believed. (120) 
 
Since hepatitis E wasn’t recognized as a distinct entity until the 1980s, determining its influence 
in historical conflicts is not entirely straight forward, although some authors have speculated 
about the role it played in the World Wars. (68, 121) In recent conflicts, the Soviet military 
experienced high rates of disease during the Afghan War of the 1980s. In fact, this was where 
research attention was first drawn to the disease, and the researcher who identified the pathogen 
obtained his sample from infected Soviet troops. (122) This experience was not replicated in 
American forces during the current conflict in Afghanistan, with one study showing 
exceptionally low rates of exposure among deployed troops. (123) It is speculated that this is 
more a reflection of the lack of exposure to local culture experienced by most American troops—
food and water for coalition forces is almost universally safe—however, some experts have 
reiterated the risk of deployments to endemic areas. (124) Indeed, deployments of allied 
militaries to Africa in recent decades have demonstrated that the risk of hepatitis E outbreaks 
exists, even when food and water supply chains are tightly regulated. Risk of exposure in 
deployed troops seems to correlate with timing of outbreaks in the civilian communities nearby, 
meaning that exposure would not be consistent across deployed groups. (125) 
 
The Need for A Vaccine 
In the 1990s, AFRIMS began to build a convincing case for the need for a Hepatitis E vaccine 
and for Nepal as an ideal area to study it, first establishing the risk to travelers in endemic area 
and then determining the burden on local populations. Researchers initially identified both 
Hepatitis A and E as endemic to the Kathmandu region of Nepal, then argued that over half of 
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those sickened with hepatitis in the region (and surrounding countries) suffered from hepatitis E. 
Those afflicted lost, on average, over three weeks of work time and, for wage-earners, 20% of 
their annual income due to their illness when lost wages and medical expenses were considered. 
(126, 127) In a country with a poverty rate of 25% and a gross national income of $730 annually, 
these losses are far from inconsequential for the average family. (128) In addition, theoretical 
cost-effectiveness analysis for endemic countries found universal vaccination to be more cost-
effective than both screening with vaccination or no vaccination. (129)  
 
By the late 1990s, scientists at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, some of 
whom had also worked on hepatitis A vaccine research, had developed a vaccine for hepatitis E. 
Quickly thereafter a partnership formed with SmithKline Beecham for clinical trials. (130, 131) 
The vaccine was created from genetic material isolated during the Sargodha, Pakistan outbreak, 
which had first spurred forward military research over a decade earlier. (132) WRAIR formed its 
own agreement with SmithKline to support clinical development of the vaccine. Phase I safety 
trials were conducted in the United States at WRAIR with 88 U.S. Army volunteers and 
subsequently an additional trial was conducted among a small group of volunteers in Nepal. 
(132, 133)  For larger trials, it was clear that an endemic location was needed, and Nepal 
provided an optimal location for a clinical trial of a hepatitis E vaccine. An Army research lab 
had been established there since 1995, and a portion of the phase I trials had been completed 
there in 1998. The Nepali army had worked with U.S. military researchers investigating hepatitis 
E, Japanese encephalitis and other diarrheal diseases, as well as conducting influenza 
surveillance over a 13-year partnership, and 19 publications had resulted by 2000. (42) In 
addition, as military researchers had established, the disease was endemic in the population, with 
past studies showing 30-40% of the young adult population had been infected in the past. (127, 
134-136)  
 
The trial was initially approved for conduct in the civilian population, with 3000 participants to 
be chosen from the city of Lalitpur, south of Kathmandu in central Nepal. Several papers have 
explored what happened next. The civilian population of the region, wary of the mission of the 
U.S. military in developing a vaccine—and understandably concerned about the degree to which 
they would benefit from the outcomes of the research—stood in protest. At the time, as Jason 
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Andrews clearly points out in his bioethical evaluation of the trial, messages were mixed. Nepali 
government officials stated that the motivation for vaccine development was not profit but rather 
saving lives, while military officials openly acknowledged the military mission to protect the 
lives of American soldiers and the pharmaceutical industry goal of a successful vaccine for 
travelers. (136, 137) In the period leading up to the proposed start of recruitment, the issue 
became increasingly contentious, with many Nepalese expressing frustration that the real 
solution to their hepatitis E problem was clean water, not a vaccine. In fact, WARUN chief Rob 
Scott admitted that Thailand would have been the go-to location for a hepatitis E vaccine trial, 
but, “WHO’s international year of potable water in Thailand in the 1980s was a success. 
‘Thailand took that very seriously’, Scott told me, ‘and their hepatitis rates plummeted which is 


















Figure 3: Vaccination performed by Dr. Sanjaya Srestha at WARUN in Nepal (1999). Dr. Srestha's father was the 
lead author of a paper reporting hepatitis E clinical trial results. (101) 
 
As a result of the controversy and their general lack of confidence that the benefits of research 
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would be shared with the community, local government officials ultimately blocked conduct of 
the trial, with the mayor of Lalitpur stating “Nepal should not be made a laboratory for the 
interests of the American Army.” (116) Instead, the trial was carried out in 2000 Nepali military 
service members in Kathmandu. Although the military participants were volunteers, the ethics of 
conducting the clinical trial in a foreign military population—at a time when the Nepali 
government was receiving military aid from the United States to support an ongoing civil war—
has also been a topic of debate among bioethicists. (138, 139) Beginning in 2001, 898 
participants received the three-vaccine hepatitis E series. The participants were followed until 
2004. The vaccine was found to be 95.5% efficacious and adverse events were equivalent 
between the two groups. The results were also suggestive but not conclusive that protection may 
be afforded after two doses of vaccine. Unfortunately, conducting a study in the Nepali military 
population meant that the study population was almost entirely male—not necessarily 
representative of the highest risk group, pregnant women. The results of the trial were published 
in 2007 in the New England Journal. (135) 
 
Shelving The Vaccine 
What happened next should not have been a surprise to those involved in research and 
development for the vaccination. The vaccine’s development went no further than the 
completion of the Nepali trial for financial reasons—GSK had decided that it did not have 
enough profit potential, even as a traveler’s vaccine, for development, and it and the U.S. 
military were unable to find anyone else to pay for its production. According to some news 
reports, GSK knew that the vaccine would not have commercial potential even before it began 
the Nepali trial, begging the question that several commentaries have brought up—why conduct 
the trial at all? There may have been, and likely was, hope that funding would come from anther 
source to fill the gap for GSK—perhaps from the U.S. government who was, after all, involved. 
Other reports suggest, however, that as late as 2008, GSK was still optimistic about the vaccine 
and hoped to find a partner to subsidize further development. Genelabs, which had isolated the 
hepatitis E virus in the early 1990s and had also had a relationship with GSK, reported to the 
SEC at the end of 2007 that “GlaxoSmithKline advised us that they have decided to continue 
development of the investigational [hepatitis E] vaccine for which they plan to undertake 
extensive clinical and manufacturing efforts.” (131)  
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Ethicist Jason Andrews addresses the issue of the shelved vaccine as well, calling the partners 
into question for waiting so long to present their results publicly, which they did in December 
2005—almost two years after the conclusion of data collection, and a year before the results 
were finally published. He suggests that this delay—the cause of which is unclear—hampered 
efforts to find a partner to fund production. (140) Andrews and several of his colleagues 
addressed a thoughtfully worded letter to GSK in 2006, pointing out their ethical concerns and 
identifying GSK as the party responsible for ensuring distribution of the vaccine. (141) In 2007, 
in response to this and several other letters questioning the ethics of a trial in the Nepali military 
population and the access local populations would receive to a vaccine, senior study authors 
(including Dr. Bruce Innis, the architect of the hepatitis A trial who had since transitioned from 
working from the military to GSK) responded: 
 
GlaxoSmithKline, along with U.S. government agencies, has supported rHEV 
vaccine research, because the company recognized the value of developing 
vaccines and medicines against diseases in the developing world — efforts it has 
undertaken for more than 20 years. Bhattarai asks about access to the vaccine 
after the trial. We affirm that GlaxoSmithKline embraces the principle of 
distributive justice and is committed to continue development of the rHEV 
vaccine so that it can be available in Nepal. Nevertheless, since control of 
infectious diseases is a global public good, we call for international financing for 
the introduction of the rHEV vaccine through partnerships similar to those 
developed for rotavirus and pneumococcal conjugate vaccines. 
 
We emphasize that GlaxoSmithKline is seeking public-sector partners who also 
are committed to the long and challenging endeavor to add the rHEV vaccine to 
immunization programs in high-risk countries. Despite competing public health 
priorities, we remain optimistic that the 95% protective efficacy of the rHEV 
vaccine can attract support. Adoption of rHEV vaccination programs in Nepal 
would be a fitting outcome for our trial’s volunteers and our many colleagues 
who since 1987 have examined options to identify and control hepatitis E. (142) 
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As of 2015, GSK has yet to find a partner and the vaccine remains unused in Nepal and 
elsewhere. Some of this is probably related to the international view of hepatitis E, which often 
places it as a low-priority public health concern. The WHO established a working group in 2013 
and will publish its first position paper on hepatitis E vaccination in 2015, well after GSK’s 
vaccine success. Lack of WHO attention to hepatitis E undoubtedly reflects its historically low 
profile compared to other public health threats, and this likely made it harder to identify a partner 
willing to fund it—indeed, CDC researchers have commented that “hepatitis E is so neglected, 
it’s left off the lists of neglected tropical diseases”. Nonetheless, the outcry related to a clinically 
tested and efficacious vaccine being shelved has not been subtle, but thus far it has had little 
impact. Commentary in the Lancet and other journals (including an article by AFRIMS 
researchers) in the years following the 2007 Nepal trial questioned what had happened to a 
vaccine that had come so far and yet done so little for the greater good:  
 
The New England Journal of Medicine (2007): The effectiveness of the rHEV 
vaccine generates hopes for prevention of disease among high-risk populations. 
But will the population at risk in Nepal benefit from this vaccine? Experience 
shows otherwise. International travelers benefit from the parenteral Vi 
capsular polysaccharide typhoid vaccine, which was tested among natives of 
Kathmandu. However, Nepalese natives do not benefit from the vaccine, 
probably owing to the vaccine’s high cost and short-term protective efficacy. 
Such examples discourage community support for research. The rationale of 
medical research cannot be justified if the population in which the research was 
carried out does not benefit from the results of the research. In this regard, the 
investigators need to clarify the usefulness of the rHEV vaccine in preventing and 
controlling disease in the native population of Nepal. (143) 
 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene (2008): 
Since vaccination appears to be both a highly effective and feasible tool to reduce 
HEV-associated morbidity and mortality, governmental, philanthropic and 
international health organisations as well as pharmaceutical industries 
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should make a concentrated effort to develop strategies to bring an effective 
vaccine to the people who need it. (144) 
The Lancet, 2010: Years have passed since the development of this (hepatitis 
E) vaccine, with no real gain for the people in the country where it was tested 
nor across the wider global community…if GSK (and) Walter Reed Armed 
Forces Institute of Medical Sciences were not going to develop these vaccines or 
make them available after their successful testing in Nepal…why were they 
tested? And if these organizations will not develop them further, is there a 
responsibility to make them available to others who might? (145) 
 
The Lancet, 2010: Because no treatment exists for HEV infection, development of 
a vaccine is the best way forward in developing and developed countries. 
However, developing countries are unlikely to have the resources needed to 
develop and test vaccines. So why have companies invested their resources in 
creating vaccines such as those for HEV that are safe and seem effective, and 
then not developed them when they are urgently needed? The answer might 
be that pharmaceutical companies do not think an HEV vaccine is 
commercially viable. (146) 
 
Liver International, 2014: the publication of this first successful clinical trial of an 
efficacious HEV vaccine generated enthusiasm and optimism. However, this 
vaccine has not reached the market because of concerns regarding its ability 
to generate sufficient revenue…Too often, the decision to develop a drug, or in 
this case a vaccine, is profit driven. Such profits are generally generated in the 
West and not in developing countries. However, our medical ethics should also 
motivate us to develop therapies for diseases which wreak havoc in 
developing countries, but not in the West. (129) 
 
The ethics of a military trial and the ultimate shelving of the vaccine combine to raise questions 
about the U.S. government’s relationships with their Nepalese allies, and what kinds of support 
are valuable in such a partnership. The United States has a historic relationship of military 
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support with Nepal through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, 
which provides modest amounts of annual funding to help improve training, build stability and 
support democracy in partner nations (Thailand is also an IMET partner). In the early 2000s, at 
the time of the hepatitis E trial, Nepal was also a beneficiary of special Foreign Military Funding, 
which provided much more substantial amounts of funding—the State Department requested 
some $27,000,000 from 2002-2004—with the intent that “FMF in Nepal will help its 
government cope with a brutal communist insurgency, restore enough stability to permit 
elections, and prevent the countryside from becoming a haven for al-Qaida and other terrorist 
groups.” (Foreign Military Aid) Most notably, Asia is only becoming a more important strategic 
focus for the U.S. military. Recent years have seen a concerted shift in military strategy toward 
Asia; in a 2012 report on strategic priorities for the 21st century, policy makers emphasized:  
 
While the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of 
necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Our relationships with 
Asian allies and key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the 
region. We will emphasize our existing alliances, which provide a vital 
foundation for Asia-Pacific security. (147) 
 
While direct military aid is one way to support our relationship with Nepal, “softer” support 
through a humanitarian program such as providing hepatitis E vaccination might be an effective 
grassroots mechanism to garner good will in the Nepali military. It would also undoubtedly 
improve military readiness. Outbreaks of hepatitis E are far from uncommon in the military 
population, a factor that was taken advantage of in the vaccine trial. Given the international 
engagement of most militaries, there are also ripple effects of allowing troops to go unprotected 
from diseases such as hepatitis E. Indeed, the Nepali military is among those blamed for 
introducing hepatitis E to Haiti as part of a UN peacekeeping mission in 1995; before a vaccine 
was available, but all the more reason that . (134) Interestingly, Nepalese soldiers serving in a 
peacekeeping capacity were also implicated in the 2010 cholera outbreak in Haiti—cholera 




A Chinese Vaccine 
While the GSK owned vaccine remained shelved, it took an entirely separate research and 
development in another country to finally bring an effective hepatitis E vaccine to the world 
market. In 2010, Chinese researchers published the results of a Phase III clinical trial of a new 
vaccine against hepatitis E, the HEV 239 vaccine. Much like development in the United States, 
the vaccine (commercially known as Hecolin) was an effort in partnership between private 
industry, academia and the government. Work on the vaccine began at Xiamen University, but 
was spurred on by investment from the Yangsheng Group. The Group paid $1.8 million in 2000 
to develop a joint laboratory, which was ultimately recognized by the Chinese government as the 
National Institute of Diagnostics and Vaccine Development in Infectious Diseases. Yangsheng 
also created a subsidiary company, Innovax, to produce the vaccine. (149) 
 
Over 100,000 participants from Jiangsu Province were involved in a randomized controlled trial 
to test the efficacy of the vaccine. The vaccine was 100% efficacious after 3 doses with no 
serious adverse effects. (150) In December 2011, the State Food and Drug Administration in 
China approved Hecolin, paving the way for use throughout China and for its evaluation by the 
WHO for use by its myriad programs. All told, the vaccine cost $80 million to develop, much of 
which came from the Chinese government, and it will be sold for approximately $18 per dose, 
with $10 million in sales anticipated in 2013. (149) 
 
The Chinese hepatitis E model shows that collaborative models will likely be the way of the 
future in bringing much needed vaccines to market. The challenge will be for countries like 
Nepal—whose government may not have nearly $80 million to pump into development, and 
whose average citizens may not be able to pay $18 for each of three doses of vaccine—to find a 
way forward. Indeed, what if, like hepatitis A in Thailand, cost-effectiveness analysis doesn’t 
pan out? Previously described cost-effectiveness data was based on a vaccine cost of $9.86, 
which is substantially lower than the predicted cost for Hecolin. (129) It is unclear whether 
China or the WHO will support vaccine implementation in countries, like Nepal, where market 





Outbreaks of hepatitis E continue to garner headlines—in 2014 alone, outbreaks were reported in 
Nepal (6000 infected), Uganda, India, and among refugees in Ethiopia and Sudan. (148) One 
1998 study identified hepatitis E carrying UN peacekeepers as the introducing source of hepatitis 
E in Haiti, with serum analysis showing that Pakistaini, Indian, and Nepali soldiers serving in the 
country carrying the highest rates of infection based on serum analysis —62%, 37% and 37% 
respectively. (134) The idea that traveling militaries have the potential to spread hepatitis to 
previously unaffected areas is a disturbing one, but not unlikely given the potential for large 
groups from various areas to work in close quarters for extended periods of time, and for military 
members to be drawn from a wider demographic than international travelers in general. Indeed, 
the same phenomenon has been noted for cholera in Haiti—a major 2010 outbreak in that 
country was introduced by UN peacekeepers, ironically from Nepal. (148) In addition, the ethical 
debate surrounding testing of the hepatitis E vaccine in Nepal shows that local populations are 
not ignorant of what their participation in research means. If the U.S. admits that its strategic 
goals include building bridges in Asia and limiting the hold of terrorist organizations in counties 
such as Nepal, presenting the U.S and its military in a positive light—not in an exploitative 
one—would be wise. In a country such as Nepal, which has both military and medical 
partnerships with the United States, appropriate reciprocation for participation in a vaccine trial 
may not simply be ethically appropriate, it may be strategically advantageous—an intervention 




Japanese encephalitis has been on the U.S. military radar as a disease of interest since at least 
World War II, when military scientists developed the first vaccine against the disease, which 
became the basis for vaccination of Asian children for decades after the war’s conclusion. The 
military also initiated, in conjunction with their Thai partners, the clinical trial that led to the 
vaccine’s approval in both countries (albeit decades after its development), and they also helped 
to develop a newer vaccine, which is the only other approved in the United States—but it rarely 
used due to its high cost. The story of JE provides an example of an alternative outcome for our 
partners—in the case of the JE vaccine, Thailand not only implemented the vaccine in a cost-
effective manner, but also has benefited financially from industry partnerships that have allowed 
them to produce both new and old JE vaccines in-country. Differentiating the nuances of what 
made Japanese Encephalitis a success story for Thailand, in opposition to the failures of hepatitis 
A in Thailand and hepatitis E in Nepal, is complex and gets to the heart of the problem of 
vaccine access.  
 
Japanese Encephalitis Epidemiology 
Unlike hepatitis A and E, Japanese Encephalitis is a vector-borne, zoonotic disease, carried by 
the Culex tritaeniorhynchus mosquito (and occasionally other Culex species) and perpetuated by 
amplifying hosts such as swine and birds. (151) As a mosquito-borne illness, management of the 
vector and water supplies is an important component of public health efforts to manage the 
disease; unfortunately, this can be exceedingly difficult in rural areas. Rice paddies are a 
common breeding ground, and complex water management techniques are required to have an 
impact on mosquito populations. Unfortunately, even with the best management, mosquitoes are 
quick to re-infest areas they have been cleared from. Likewise, management of the vector with 
pesticide has not generally proven useful—because of logistic and cost-effectiveness reasons, 
pesticide is nearly impossible to apply on a large enough basis to adequately control mosquito 
populations, and thus disease. (152) Efforts to reduce human infections by interfering with swine 
infection, including using vaccination, have also proven less useful. (153) Difficulties in 
environmental management have long made human vaccination the ideal public health approach 
to Japanese Encephalitis, as articulated by PATH: 
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Interventions other than immunization have not significantly reduced morbidity 
and mortality from JE disease. Although good quality care improves outcome, 
there are no antiviral medications available to treat JE. Mosquito and pig-control 
methods have shown very limited impact, have significant limitations, and are not 
recommended as a focus for JE control. Immunization is the only reliable and 
effective method to control disease. (154)  
 
Compared to hepatitis A and E, Japanese Encephalitis is a disease of smaller clinical scale but 
more significant consequences. Approximately 30-50,000 reported cases occur annually 
throughout Asia, where it is endemic in 24 countries; one WHO estimate of total clinical cases 
placed the actual incidence closer to 68,000 per year. (151) The actual infection rate is certainly 
much higher than this; however, the majority of Japanese encephalitis infections are 
asymptomatic, such that anywhere from 25-1000 times as many infections occur as become 
clinically significant. (155) What is notable about the virus, and what makes it such an important 
public health concern, is its high morbidity and mortality. With a fatality rate of up to 30% 
among those who are symptomatic and a disability rate of up to 50% among survivors, it causes 
10,000 deaths and results in serious disability in 15,000 people per year (151, 154) Throughout 
Asia, the current burden of disease varies significantly, however, with annual disability adjusted 
life years ranging from 0 in Japan, where human vaccination programs have been in place for 
decades, to over 30/100,000 in Laos, Cambodia, and Pakistan, where vaccination is uncommon 
and the population remains more rural. (156) 
 
Because it is vector-borne and not related to clean water supplies, Japanese Encephalitis affects 
developed and developing nations much more equally than hepatitis A and E, although vaccine 
access now serves as a cause of disparity in place of clean water. Indeed, it is likely that the 
significant potential for disease in wealthy countries accounts for why a vaccine has been in use 
for decades in Asia. Despite exceptional control for decades and reduction of many of the 
environmental factors that perpetuate the vector, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea continue to 
recommend vaccination of all children against the disease. Even in low-income countries, 
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As its name implies, Japanese Encephalitis originated, or at least was first appreciated, in Japan, 
although it is not unique to that area. Summer epidemics of Japanese encephalitis were 
recognized in Japan as early as the 1870s, but it and other forms of vector-borne encephalitis 
were not fully characterized until the 1930s, when the virus was isolated from the brain of a 
patient. This was too late for its impact on military campaigning to be measured in conflicts prior 
to World War II. (155) In the lead-up to that war, concern over deployments to Asia and the 
Pacific led to recognition of the threat posed by Japanese Encephalitis, but relatively little was 
known about the disease by American scientists, and they weren’t in a position to obtain 
information from the more knowledgeable Japanese. Nonetheless, a rapid and concerted effort 
















Figure 4: AFRIMS scientists trap a swallow during research studying the spread of JE in Thailand. (157) 
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“Nakayama” strain of virus in infected mouse brains; this now-famous strain had been isolated 
from a fatal case in 1935. Major Albert Sabin, of polio fame, was the creator, and the vaccine 
was developed under the auspices of the Commission on Neurotropic Virus Diseases of the 
Army Epidemiology Board.6 (158, 159) Unfortunately, it was unclear whether this early vaccine 
was entirely effective, and as an unpurified vaccine derived from mouse brain cells, the vaccine 
also caused periodic encephalomyelitis.  
 
At the end of World War II, a cluster of Japanese Encephalitis cases occurred among the U.S. 
military serving in Okinawa, Japan, in the context of a larger epidemic in the area. The Sabin 
vaccine was used on close to 70,000 military personnel in the region in an attempt to control the 
epidemic; however, a controlled trial of its efficacy was unable to be undertaken at the time, and 
in hindsight, it appeared that vaccination might have started too late to have a major impact on 
the outbreak anyway. Observations by Sabin on the outbreak and vaccination effort suggested 
that at the very least, the vaccine did not produce significant side effects—although fears of this 
were not completely dispelled.  (160) Overall, however, rates of infection remained mercifully 
low through the war, although an additional 250,000 personnel did receive vaccination following 
the Okinawa outbreak. (161) 
 
In the years following the war’s end and extending through the Korean War there were small 
numbers of cases among American service members each year, including an outbreak of 300 
cases in Korea in 1950. (162) All military personnel serving in the region during this period 
received vaccination with a modified vaccine, which used both mouse brain and chick-embryo 
derivatives. (161) Military cases of Japanese Encephalitis also occurred throughout the Vietnam 
War—24 in 1967, 57 in 1969, and 61 in 1970. (22, 163-166) One such case occurred in 1972, 
when an American Marine stationed at an airbase in Thailand fell ill and drew the attention of 
AFRIMS researchers, who had been working on Japanese Encephalitis in Thailand since 1969. 
During this period, no vaccination was given to deployed Soldiers, although this was not for lack 
of perceived need—the official military history of the period noted “The continuing yearly 
epidemics in Vietnam and the still unresolved problem of late sequelae in subclinical infection 
                                                
6 Incidentally, Dr. Sabin also developed a dengue vaccine during his time in the military (1944), 
and these two efforts are his first vaccine successes, albeit not his most famous. 
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warrant serious consideration of the development of protective immunization for individuals 
















Figure 5: An AFRIMS team sets out for the day during the 1970 JE study in Chiang Mai, Thailand. (101) 
 
Vaccination for the West and the Rest 
The history of Japanese Encephalitis vaccine development and implementation traces a 
continuous path from its origins during the Second World War. Despite questions about the 
Sabin vaccine’s efficacy, at the conclusion of the Second World War the vaccine technology was 
passed to the Japanese government, which continued its use among the nation’s children and also 
conducted research to improve the vaccine technology. Much of this work was conducted at the 
Research Foundation of Microbial Disease at Osaka University (“BIKEN”). While the U.S 
military ceased use of both forms of vaccine after 1951 based on unproven efficacy, in Japan, 
trials using the mouse-brain/chick-embryo were conducted on children in Okinawa in the second 
half of the 1940s, with over 50,000 children vaccinated and followed for several years. These 
trials showed lower rates of infection in vaccinated children, although the results were not 


























Figure 6: A military researcher collects mosquitoes while studying the 1972 Marine outbreak of JE at the airbase in 
Nam Phong, Thailand. (101) 
 
In 1965, this unpurified vaccine was tested in a massive Taiwanese clinical trial conducted in the 
northern counties of the country, where disease incidence was highest. Over 250,000 Taiwanese 
children were randomized to receive the JE vaccine or placebo; a small subset of each group 
received one dose, while the majority received two.  Through the study, the participants were 
compared to unvaccinated children in the region. Over two decades after the original vaccine had 
begun to be used in large numbers of Japanese children, the Taiwanese trial finally proved both 
the safety and relative efficacy of the Japanese Encephalitis vaccine—two doses of vaccine gave 
81% efficacy and a statistically significant decrease in morbidity compared to placebo. (167) 
 
Simultaneously, Japanese researchers had developed a purified version of the vaccine that 
reduced the risk of encephalopathy. Almost immediately and despite no clinical trial evidence of 
the vaccine's efficacy, this became a routine vaccination for Japanese children between the ages 
of 3 and 15. Because of this vaccination program and increasingly aggressive vector control 
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efforts, the disease quickly became uncommon in Japan, falling from a rate of 2.5/100,000 in the 
1950s and 1960s to 0.01/100,000 by the 1990s. (154) To put this remarkable decline in other 
terms, in the 1920s, a single epidemic killed nearly 4000 people; by the early 1970s, fewer than 
100 cases occurred annually in Japan, and that has dropped to under 10 per year over the past 
two decades. (168, 169) The newest studies have confirmed that developed countries like Japan 
have no more than a handful of clinical cases per year.  (165, 170) Interestingly, much like the 
earliest vaccine, which was used for decades without strong evidence of its efficacy, the vaccine 
that prompted these steady decreases in disease incidence was also used without a randomized 
trial. A clinical trial to prove the efficacy of the vaccine was attempted in Korea in 1968, but few 
cases occurred that year and the trial was inconclusive.  
 
For decades after World War II the threat of Japanese Encephalitis continued to be recognized by 
the U.S. military, but little headway was made in vaccination, and the American military was 
less ambitious than the Japanese government in terms of using untested vaccines. All this 
changed in the early 1980s, when two Americans—one a university professor, the other a 
university student—contracted Japanese Encephalitis while in China. Both subsequently died, 
raising the profile of the disease significantly in the United States; even a few years after the 
death of 20-year-old student studying abroad in Beijing, the story remained intriguing enough for 
the New Yorker magazine to write a substantial piece about the death and its repercussions. (153, 
171) Indeed, the story was compelling: for the father of John Zeidman, his son’s death became 
the motivation for a crusade to bring a Japanese Encephalitis vaccine to the United States. By 
1982, he had succeeded in having a Japanese-produced vaccine approved as an Investigational 
New Drug. (172) The vaccine underwent small-scale evaluation by the CDC and was available 
on an investigational basis from 1983-1987, with some 17,000 doses administered to American 
travelers through CDC clinics during this period. (165, 166) In June 1987, before it had become 
approved or generally available, the Japanese manufacturer chose to stop distribution to the 
United States due concerns over liability, but the tide had nonetheless turned, and American 



























Figure 7: A soldier receives treatment for JE at the 93d Evacuation Hospital in Long Binh, Vietnam. (174) 
 
At roughly the same time, public health authorities in Thailand were debating the use of the 
Japanese Encephalitis vaccine to reduce cases in their country. The disease had first been 
reported there in 1961, with annual outbreaks occurring through the 1960s; a particularly heavy 
rainy season led to the first recorded epidemic in Chiang Mai in 1969. The following year, 
AFRIMS (then SEATO) researchers collaborated with local medical centers to evaluate the 
disease in the region. In 1972, their investigation of a case of encephalitis in a U.S. Marine led 
them to identify a major epidemic and “launch a full-scale epidemiological investigation of what 
proved to be a major outbreak of this disease.” (101). Their work established the epidemiology 
of the virus in the area, including the seasonal nature of transmission, the importance of local 
geography and climatological factors, and the relationship of swine and Culex mosquito 
populations to transmission rates. (175, 176) Through the decades of the 1960s through the 
1980s, 1500-2500 cases of encephalitis were reported per year—an incidence of up to 3/100,000 
nationally, with most cases concentrated in the Northern provinces during the rainy summer 
months, where the incidence could rise as high as 20/100,000. (177) The case fatality ratio was 
consistently 20-30%. (178)  
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The timeline of Thailand’s Japanese Encephalitis experience is consistent with the rest of the 
continent. Beginning in the 1970s, the disease began to experience a resurgence in Asia, 
spreading in range, returning to areas where it had been under control, and increasing in 
prevalence nearly everywhere. Rapid population growth in Asia, increased land area devoted to 
rice paddies and growing pork production—in Thailand, area under rice cultivation grew by 14% 
and pork production increased 80% from 1990-2005—are all theorized to be among the 
causative human factors. (156) By the 1990s, it had reached never-before affected Pakistan, 
India, and parts of Indonesia and Australia. (155) Over 44,000,000 people in Thailand now live 
in endemic areas. Data from one-time serum samples taken in 1989 (when vaccination was 
available but not widely used in Thailand) showed that among rural children, 7-32/1000 had 
recently been infected with Japanese Encephalitis. (179)  
 
Beginning in 1973, the Thai government attempted to manage Japanese Encephalitis through 
vector control and avoidance; but as is well documented throughout Asia, these efforts were 
“basically ineffective.” (178) Human vaccination was recognized as potentially the only highly 
effective approach to disease control, but there continued to be concerns about the feasibility of 
using the vaccine on a nationwide scale, most notably related to cost: 
 
The high cost of JE vaccine ($2.30 per dose in 1988) is a major hindrance to the 
use of vaccination for JE control in both government and private sectors. The 
Department of CDC (in Thailand) has been attempting the use of JE vaccine, but 
the vaccine cost and the characteristic distribution of JEV infection and JE cases 
have put JE at a lower priority among vaccine preventable diseases whose control 
costs are to be borne by the Department. (170, 178) 
 
The Thai government ultimately decided to pursue a vaccination strategy to control Japanese 
encephalitis in their country, but were not prepared to implement vaccination without a trial in 
their population. AFRIMS, which had researched the disease for over a decade and provided 
much of the evidence that defined the Thai encephalitis problem, proved the perfect organization 
to execute a large-scale clinical trial. The timing was also right for American researchers, with 
demand heightened for an FDA approved vaccine.  Beginning in March 1984, children were 
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recruited to a large clinical trial to study the efficacy of the BIKEN vaccines. Over 65,000 Thai 
children were ultimately selected to participate, and received two doses of either bivalent 
(composed of the traditional Nakayama strain plus the Beijing-1 stain, which had shown by 

























Figure 8: A child is vaccinated at Kamphaeng Phet Hospital as part of the 1984 JE clinical trial. (101) 
 
Both vaccines had efficacy rates of 91%, with an attack rate for vaccinated children of 5/100,000 
compared to 51/100,000 for unvaccinated children. Side-effects were uncommon and mild. In 
concluding, the authors of the study—which was published in the New England Journal in 
1988—acknowledged “immunization of children in Asia against Japanese encephalitis virus 
remains a difficult problem. Although safe and effective, the vaccine is expensive, and other 
health problems are pressing in the region.” (177)  
 
Vaccine Implementation 
The vaccine was licensed for use in the United States in 1992, although it was ultimately 
removed from the market in the mid-2000s because of supply issues. (180) In 2005, the Japanese 
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government had discontinued its recommendation for use of the BIKEN vaccine based on largely 
unsubstantiated safety concerns, and by 2007, production of the long-used vaccine had 
completely ceased, although newer vaccines have since been developed to replace it in Japan. 
(181) In 2009, Ixiaro (which was also developed with substantial military contributions) was 
approved in the United States, and this vaccine continues to be available and recommended for 
use in American travelers going to endemic areas for one month or longer. (182) The high cost of 
the vaccine—in the hundreds of dollars and generally not covered by insurance—is a barrier to 
vaccination, even for travelers from wealthy countries, and also calls into question the cost-
effectiveness for travelers. (183, 184)7 
 
Fortunately, unlike hepatitis A and in spite of the high cost of vaccination, the cost-benefit 
analysis of Japanese encephalitis vaccination in Thailand, and other countries in Asia as well, 
was favorable. A 1997 analysis of vaccination in Thailand estimated treatment of each acute case 
of encephalitis would cost $1660, but found that the most substantial savings came from 
preventing disability, which was associated with profound long-term costs. Each prevented case 
would represent a savings of $72,922 over the long term. It also compared vaccination of 18-
month-olds with that of primary school aged children, and found that infants should be the 
priority for vaccination. (154, 181, 185) Similar cost-effectiveness evidence has been found in 
other Asian countries as well, but despite the clear data, vaccination policies throughout Asia 
vary significantly. Taiwan, Japan and Korea—all wealthy and all with country-wide risk of 
disease—have the most long-standing and robust programs, with recommendations for childhood 
vaccination in place since 1968, 1967, and the 1970s respectively. China, with the largest at-risk 
population in Asia, had an incomplete vaccination program beginning in 1981; it was not until 
2008 that it added Japanese Encephalitis to its Expanded Immunization Program for all children 
in endemic areas. Thailand’s high incidence neighbors, Cambodia, Laos, and Malaysia, have 
either no or extremely young and limited programs in place. Thailand implemented a vaccination 
program not long after the conclusion of publication of trial results. (154) 
 
                                                
7 The Japanese Encephalitis experience of replacing a long-standing, effective vaccine with a newer, more 
expensive (but sometimes minimally improved and potentially unavailable) vaccine has been seen in 
multiple cases—hepatitis B and rabies among them—and begs the question of where precious research 
resources should be expended. 
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The Japanese Encephalitis vaccine was included on the Thai National Immunization Program in 
1990. Initially, it was recommended for 18-month-old children only in high-risk regions, which 
was categorized as eight northern provinces. The recommendation gradually progressed to 
include a larger geographic area. As new provinces were added to the infant immunization 
schedule through the 1990s, a graduated program of “catch-up” immunization of grade-schoolers 
was also implemented. In the year 2000, all 76 provinces were incorporated into immunization 
plan. By 2003, one study documented high rates of compliance with vaccination—among 2-3 
year olds, 92% and 87% respectively had received their first and second vaccinations. (186) 
Incidence of Japanese Encephalitis dropped rapidly after beginning in 1990, from as high as 
3/100,000 cases annually to well below 1/100,000. (187) Thailand is one of six countries that is 
considered to have controlled Japanese encephalitis, with an estimated rate of 0.07/100,000—43 
total cases in 2007. (154) 
 
Even before its widespread implementation, Thailand appeared to be strategizing ways to gain 
access to the Japanese Encephalitis vaccine; they did so through an effective model of 
partnership with the pharmaceutical industry that significantly enhanced their national vaccine 
production capacity. BIKEN was the long-time Japanese producer of JE-Vax, the original 
vaccine and the subject of the 1984 Thai trial. In conjunction with the Japanese government, 
BIKEN initially supported the vaccine in Thailand through technology transfer and other 
technical assistance. Beginning in 1985, Thailand started to produce vaccine on a pilot-scale to 
facilitate trials. Following approval of the vaccine, production was scaled-up and Thailand was 
eventually able to produce 40% of its national vaccine need at a government owned factory; it 
imported the remainder from BIKEN in Japan. (188) The factory, the centerpiece of the Thai 
Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO), was founded in the 1930s. Its early mission 
was to research herbal products, but it soon evolved to produce medications and reduce Thai 
reliance on importing pharmaceutical products. (189) In 1989, the GPO factory switched from 
the Nakayama strain vaccine to the recently tested bivalent (Nakayama/Beijing 1) vaccine. (190) 
 
In 1997, French pharmaceutical company Sanofi-Pasteur entered into a joint venture with the 
Thai government to fund the construction of a vaccine manufacturing plant that was completed 
in 2002; they subsequently transferred vaccine technology to the Thai Governmental 
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Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) through the GPO-Merieux Biological Products Co (GPO-
MBP).  Ownership of the GPO-MBP is held equally by the Thai government via the GPO and 
Sanofi Pasteur. The vaccine factory is the only WHO pre-approved facility in Thailand and 
currently produces vaccines for hepatitis B, rabies, measles, polio, flu and Japanese encephalitis, 
and has allowed Thailand to meet not only its national needs—in 2006, it produced over 25 
million vaccine doses for the country—but to become a vaccine producer for the region and in 
the case of certain drugs (such as antiretrovirals), for other parts of the world. (191) Sales in 
2011 were $349,000,000, and the GPO also succeeded in reducing drug costs within Thailand by 
10% that year. (192-194) The GPO continues to conduct research and development on herbal 
products, medications of local and regional import, and with WHO support recently completed 
construction of an influenza vaccine plant. (195) 
 
An update to the GPO-Sanofi partnership, with a significant upgrade to the production facility, 
was announced in 2013 with the goal of producing a tetravalent JE vaccine. In exchange for the 
upgrade and technology, the Thai Public Health Ministry agreed to purchase six vaccines from 
GPO-MBP. Thailand will become the regional producer for the Imojev vaccine (also known at 
Thaijev), a live, attenuated, recombinant chimeric Japanese Encephalitis virus vaccine that was 
approved in Thailand and Australia in 2010. The vaccine, which was originally known as 
Chimerivax and manufactured by Acambis, is based on the novel method produced by Dr. Tom 
Monath, a researcher who spent 24 years in the U.S. Public Health Service and U.S. Army, 
including time as the Chief of Virology at USAMRIID, before moving to the pharmaceutical 
industry. (181, 196) There are plans for the vaccine to be exported to other Asian countries and 
Australia. (191, 197-199) 
 
Other Directions for JE Research  
Even though a clinically tested, effective Japanese Encephalitis vaccine was available in the 
United States and abroad as of the early 1990s, this did not represent the end of the vaccine story, 
or of military research. As early as the mid-1980s, while testing of the BIKEN mouse brain 
derived vaccine was underway in Thailand, WRAIR scientists in the United States were 
beginning to work on a cell-culture derived vaccine intended to improve on some of the concerns 
surrounding the mouse brain vaccine—namely, low immunogenicity, difficult production, and 
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safety concerns. A promising new candidate vaccine emerged in 1986 via a Chinese researcher, 
Dr. Yu Yong Xin, who had developed a prototype vaccine from a strain called SA 14-14-2 
cultured in dog kidney cells, which were used in the measles and rubella vaccines used in the 
United States. (81) Beginning in the 1990s, this strain of Japanese Encephalitis virus was used in 
China to vaccinate millions of people, and had been shown in large trials to be efficacious after 
one dose of immunization. (180) Walter Reed researchers used this concept, but modified the 
vaccine to culture it in Vero cells. From 2001-2003, WRAIR conducted a phase II trial in 94 
participants using a Vero cell derived vaccine produced at their Pilot Bioproduction Facility; 
they evaluated subjects in four groups, one of which received the older JE-VAX for comparison 
purposes. The trial showed very high rates of seroconversion with the new vaccine (100% at the 
highest vaccine doses) with no more significant side effects than the standard JE-VAX. (200) 
 
WRAIR partnered with pharmaceutical company Intercell to develop and produce the vaccine. 
While early trials and experimental vaccine production were overseen by Walter Reed, phase III 
trials and commercial scale production were taken over by InterCell after the success of the 
Phase II trial, with the vaccine technology transferred to Intercell’s factory in Livingston, 
England. Phase III trials were conducted exclusively by Intercell; unlike other vaccines, where 
WRAIR’s international partnerships had been useful for completing field trials, JE trials could be 
undertaken in Europe because “licensure of the JE vaccine did not require field efficacy trials 
because vaccine-induced neutralizing antibody at a titer of 1:10 or greater is an accepted 
surrogate of protection from Japanese Encephalitis Virus (JEV)”. (201) Over multiple studies, 
the vaccine, soon to be known commercially as Ixiaro, performed slightly better than the licensed 
vaccine, prompting seroconversion in 98% of recipients (compared to 95% of those receiving the 
older vaccine). (202-204) Ultimately, the vaccine was licensed to several pharmaceutical 
companies for large-scale distribution: Novartis in the Americas and Europe; Biological E. Ltd. 
in India and parts of Asia; and Bioterapies in Australia and parts of the Pacific. (181) The 
vaccine was approved by the FDA 2010 and became one of two licensed Japanese Encephalitis 






Japanese encephalitis represents, in many ways, a happy compromise between the interests of the 
U.S. military, the needs of its foreign research partners, and the best interests of the people of 
Asia and Thailand in particular. Confronting a significant threat to military readiness and public 
health, the military developed the technology behind the oldest as well as one of the newest 
vaccines available, which represent the two licensed in the United States; it contributed to the 
basic science and epidemiological understanding of the disease, which arguably built the case for 
childhood vaccination in Thailand; and it facilitated testing that made the vaccine available to the 
Thai people and to U.S. travelers and service members. The Thai government, for its part, 
appeared to be the force that drove forward clinical testing, and it not only ensured that its 
population benefited from the development of a vaccine, but that the national economy benefited 
from a direct partnership with the pharmaceutical industry. By developing production capacity 
and enhancing the biotechnology sector in its country, it also paved the way for future growth 
and greater opportunities in this area. The pharmaceutical industry also benefited, establishing 
production capacity in a low cost country within the region while building a partnership with an 





I will focus the last case on an ongoing research project, one which differs in significant ways—
including the scale of disease prevalence, funding, and attention—from those discussed already. 
It is also the most concerted and diverse military partnership of the four examples, involving not 
just industry (yet again, the military found itself working with GSK) but a new player—a 
nonprofit—in the team pushing for vaccine development. This model means, uniquely, this 
vaccine also has a plan for access, even before it is approved clinically. Malaria thus provides 
what could be a model for other military projects in order to improve access, even for small scale 
or regionally limited projects.  
 
Malaria in the Military and the World 
Malaria has played a role in American history since the nation’s founding and has likewise been 
a factor in the Revolution, Civil War, and nearly every military expeditionary action of the last 
150 years, resulting in 50 years of military research on the disease—research that has led to a 
U.S. military influence on half of all malaria vaccine candidates developed worldwide. (45) 
During the Revolution, both sides were wracked with disease during campaigning in the 
Southern states, although the British were affected more substantially. Some scholars have gone 
so far as to credit the heinous effects of malaria with influencing major strategic decisions by the 
British that affected the outcome of the war. (205) In the 1830s, military campaigns against the 
Seminole in Florida led to the expansion of the use of large doses of quinine for malaria therapy. 
During the Civil War, the Union suffered over 1 million cases of malaria and 10,000 deaths; in 
his memoirs, GEN Ulysses S. Grant mentions the suffering caused by “malaria fevers” during 
the Vicksburg campaign. MAJ Walter Reed studied malaria outbreaks during the Spanish-
American War, and later, while working with COL William Crawford Corgas in Cuba, 
established the importance of mosquitos in transmitting infectious diseases. This led to a sharp 
decline in cases during the construction of the Panama Canal, thanks solely to improved control 
of mosquitoes. In World War II, there were 600,000 cases of malaria concentrated largely in the 
Pacific theater, but also in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. GEN Douglas MacArthur 
apparently stated “this will be a long war if for every division I have facing the enemy I must 
count on a second division in hospital with malaria and a third division convalescing from this 
debilitating disease!” (206) In the Korea era, the military set up trials of primaquine, and used it 
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to treat returning troops. In Vietnam, 100,000 cases were reported, and malaria was “the leading 
cause of medical disability”. The recognition of chloroquine resistant malaria in Southeast Asia 
was the instigator of a WRAIR directed malaria program, as “the Army recognized that there 
was little economic incentive for private pharmaceutical firms to undertake antimalarial drug 
discovery activities. From a commercial perspective, it makes little sense to produce costly 
pharmaceuticals for people who cannot afford shoes.” (33, 207)   
 




















Figure 11: A World War II image reminds soldiers about the threat of malaria. (209) 
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In modern operations, malaria has affected the campaign in Afghanistan, and all forces deployed 
from March to November are currently mandated to use malaria chemoprophylaxis. (210) Small 
operations are routinely affected, too—the most memorable in recent memory may be the 
infection of 80 Marines in Liberia, most of whom were not taking the mefloquine they had been 
prescribed and half of whom required evacuation back to the United States for treatment. (33) 
The cost, side effects (including the high profile psychiatric side effects of mefloquine), and 
difficulties with compliance (in Afghanistan, a 30-56% compliance rate is cited in the literature) 
associated with malaria chemoprophylaxis have all been cited in the literature and popular media 
as downsides to this approach to prevention, and are a strong impetus for the ongoing research 
into an effective malaria vaccine. (211) 
 
The global impact of malaria needs little introduction. The dramatic statistics—which vary 
according to the source—indicate 200 million cases per year and at least 600,000 deaths, 
possibly many more. These statistics are perhaps even more notable when compared to those of 
just a decade ago, when deaths peaked—the WHO estimates over 800,000 deaths in 2004, while 
an independent group sponsored by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation called WHO 
numbers into question, placing deaths for that year at 1.8 million. (212, 213) In either case, these 
statistics are astounding, and deaths are far from the only metric by which malaria’s impact 
should be measured. The societal and economic repercussions of malaria are also notable, with 
major effects on economic growth—which is significantly lower in countries affected by 
Plasmodium falciparum—and per capita GDP—which is five-fold lower in malaria-endemic 
countries. Direct costs from malaria are estimated at $12 billion per year worldwide and the 
indirect costs and dampening effects on economic growth are significantly higher. (214) Even 
population growth may be related to malaria—demographers speculate that the high childhood 
mortality resulting from malaria is also tied to the persistence of high birth rates, which have 
additional economic effects for a society. (215) 
 
Over recent years, funding for the fight against malaria has been as dramatic as the disease 
epidemiology. Over the past 7 years, funding for malaria research and development specifically 
has averaged in the $500-600 million range each year. By 2011, nearly half of that funding came 
from the public sector, and less than 20%—roughly $105 million per year—from industry. A 
 68 
more detailed breakdown of average public sector funding over recent years includes major 
players from the U.S. government—$121,000,000 per year from the NIH, $31,000,000 from the 
Department of Defense, and $9,000,000 from USAID. NIH funding is topped only by the Gates 
Foundation, which provides a full quarter of annual research and development funds—
$155,000,000. (216) Research funding equates to a mere fraction of the total spending on 
malaria, which was estimated at $2.55 billion in 2010. (217) U.S. pledges and payments, 
amounting to over $13,000,000,000 from 2001-2016, account for roughly one third of the funds 
committed to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria—which, in turn, 
provides half of the international funding for malaria funding. (218) The U.S. also contributed an 
additional $1 billion per year from 2008-2013 as part of individual legislation, and USAID 
funding reaches into the hundreds of millions each year—$619 million in 2013. (219) Cleary, the 
price tag of fighting malaria in the present and striving to prevent it in the future is remarkable, 
and the pressure to develop a vaccine is heavy. 
 
Military malaria vaccine research has received just a tiny fraction of total global funding, 
garnering between $6-8 million in annual funding through the early 2000s. (220) This amount of 
funding is on par with the amount USAID spends on malaria vaccine R&D, but a fraction of the 
$30 million spent by the NIAID. (220) Several independent organizations have called for greater 
funding for military malaria research, including PATH, which called the DOD “a leader in 
tropical and infectious disease research” and suggested that “doubling the Army and Navy’s 
budgets for malaria vaccine development would allow these programs to move candidates 
already in the vial into clinical testing.” (221) In its comprehensive report on the military malaria 
program, the IOM concluded, “the DOD should markedly enhance its research and development 
efforts to produce malaria vaccines suitable for military needs. The large investment (at least 
$300 million) that is required to give a high likelihood of success in producing a vaccine in the 
next 10 years needs to be acknowledged and planned for.” (33) Despite the relative budget 
limitations, the military has been highly productive throughout its 50-year history. 
 
Developing a Vaccine — A Three-way Partnership 
Before vaccines were considered a possibility, the military turned to prophylactic drugs, using a 
series of synthetic prophylactic drugs to replace quinine beginning in World War II. First came 
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atarbine, which was developed in Germany but synthesized independently by American 
scientists and used extensively during the war. Subsequent military research efforts examined 
over 15,000 potential compounds for their antimalarial effect, and several successful agents, 
including primaquine, emerged from these efforts. (206) In 1963, the U.S. Army Research 
Program on Malaria was established as a subsidiary of WRAIR in response to the need for new 
drugs to combat chloroquine-resistant malaria. New military research findings and treatments 
were quick to follow, including mefloquine. The military also funded research at civilian 
institutions, including landmark work published in the early 1970s demonstrating immunity 
acquired through the use of irradiated sporozoites. (222) This proof of principle research showed 
that a vaccine for malaria could be developed, and it occurred just as the American military 
gained firsthand experience on the effects of malaria in combat—over 100,000 cases occurred 
among military personnel during the Vietnam War, a rate of just under 1% in 1965, representing 
a significant impact on combat power. (33) 
 
With evidence of induced malaria immunity, the military devoted itself to finding a vaccine, and 
by the early 1980s scientists at WRAIR had identified the circumsporozoite protein (CSP), a 
surface antigen of the malaria sporozoite that could be used as a vaccine target. The gene was 
cloned and sequenced by scientists at the NIH and WRAIR.  With a potential target, WRAIR 
entered into a CRADA with Glaxo-Smithkline (GSK) in 1984 to produce a malaria vaccine using 
GSK’s recombinant Escherichia coli expression systems. Together they developed FSV-1, the 
world’s first malaria vaccine candidate.  In 1987, in a small clinical trial, six volunteers were 
given the vaccine and then exposed to malaria carrying mosquitoes.  While FSV-1 was deemed 
ineffective, one of the volunteers was granted immunity by the vaccine, the first time that a 
human was made immune to malaria through a simple vaccine. This WRAIR trial was followed 
by the first malaria clinical trial conducted at an international Walter Reed Project laboratory, 
this one in Kenya. (223) Over the following few years, GSK and WRAIR both independently 
conducted additional trials on a number of malaria vaccine candidates, but continued to run up 
against low immunogenicity.  
 
Through further cooperation, WRAIR and GSK were able to develop the RTS,S malaria vaccine 
candidate. (224) Unlike previous vaccines, this vaccine utilized a fusion protein from malaria 
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CSP and hepatitis B surface antigen coupled with a novel adjuvant. (223) Together, WRAIR and 
GSK conducted monkey trials, following by initial safety trials and subsequently Phase IIa trials 
at WRAIR. (223) Larger Phase I trials were conducted beginning in 1997 in the Gambia 
involving 20 male volunteers, and the vaccine was found to be safe and well-tolerated. (225) 
Additional studies in children were conducted in The Gambia and Mozambique with the same 
results for safety, and these showed, for the first time, protection against malaria over time—
30% efficacy against clinical malaria and 58% protection against severe malaria, maintained 
over 6-month follow-up. (226) In 2001-2002, with RTS,S in hand and some data on its efficacy, 
WRAIR and GSK formed a partnership with the Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI), a nonprofit 
organization founded in 1999 as a component of PATH with the support of the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation. (227) In order to reduce the financial risk it would be taking to develop a 
malaria vaccine, GSK requested $25 million from the Gates Foundation. The Gates Foundation 
made a $50 million commitment to the MVI to support development of a malaria vaccine; MVI 
received another $100 million from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in 2003 and $108 
million in 2005. When the vaccine advanced to Phase III trials, MVI committed an additional 
$107 million to the effort. (223, 228, 229) 
 
Phase III trials were started in March 2009 through collaboration with the governments of seven 
African countries; the trial was sponsored by GSK and participants included wide ranging 
interests known as the RTS,S Clinical Trials Partnership, among them KEMRI-Walter Reed 
scientists. Test sites included Kilifi, Kombew, and Siaya, Kenya (with Kombewa the site of a 
WRAIR research lab); Nanoro, Burkina Faso; Lambarene, Gabon; Kumasi and Kintampo, 
Ghana; Manhica, Mozambique; Bagamoyo and Korogwem Tanzania; and Lilongwe, Malawi. 
(230) The trials focused on testing RTS,S in children, who suffer the majority of malaria deaths, 
and over 15,000 children in two age groups were enrolled. (231-233) Preliminary results were 
published in 2011, detailing outcomes in the first 6000 children in older (5-17 months) age 
group. The trial demonstrated a 55.8% effect against clinical malaria and a 47.3% vaccine 
efficacy against severe malaria with serious adverse reactions occurring at similar frequencies for 
the control and vaccinated groups. (231) The following year, results from the younger (6-12 
weeks) age group were published, showing lower efficacy for infants—30.1% against clinical 
malaria and 26.0% against severe malaria. (232) Although the infant results are less impressive 
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than earlier trials, overall these are nonetheless promising results for a vaccine that could be 
combined with current malaria fighting techniques to reduce the number of malaria deaths by an 
estimated 1,000-1,500 lives a day, and the vaccine could also serve as a step forward while a 






















Figure 12: The first child is vaccinated in Bagamoyo, Tanzania during the RTS,S malaria vaccine trial. (234) 
 
In late 2013, final results from the RTS,S trial, including nearly 3 years of follow-up, were 
presented. Results from 18-month follow-up were largely consistent with earlier results, with 
46% efficacy against clinical malaria for children vaccinated at an older age and 27% efficacy 
for infants. (235) Three year follow-up of phase II clinical trial participants showed that efficacy 
was lost entirely by three years post vaccination. It also found that the vaccine’s efficacy was 
lower in higher transmission areas. (236) Four-year follow-up showed 29.9% efficacy against a 
first case of Falciparum malaria and 16.8% efficacy against all malaria exposures over the time 
period. (237) In July 2014, GSK submitted a regulatory application to the EU for approval of the 
vaccine; that process is still underway, but GSK suggests that approval and a WHO policy 
recommendation on use of the vaccine may be completed by late 2015. (238) Based in large part 
on the substantial funding provided by MVI, Glaxo Smithkline announced in 2010 that it will not 
seek to make a profit off any sales of the RTS,S malaria vaccine. Instead, it plans to sell the 
vaccines at a price that will allow it to cover the $350 million that it cites as its costs in 
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developing the vaccine (it also indicates that it anticipates investing another $260 million in the 
future), plus 5% overage that it intends to reinvest into additional research projects. (238, 239)  
 
When a vaccine is approved and recommended by the WHO, it seems likely that the vaccine will 
achieve widespread use in Africa fairly quickly, given the pricing scheme proposed by GSK and 
the large amount of public and private interest and funding devoted to malaria. GSK’s own 
promotional materials state “if and when the vaccine is approved, further partnerships and 
collaborations will be necessary to help facilitate its delivery and implementation across Africa 
as quickly as possible.” (240) GSK has also provided funding to nonprofit organizations to 
investigate the cost of implementing malaria vaccination in different African countries. (241) 
This represents both a philanthropic and a pragmatic choice on the part of the company, as 
widespread dispersion of the vaccine is in the best interest of GSK, and the high degree of 
publicity associated with the malaria vaccine means that GSK is certain to be careful about 
handling media perception of the company and its work. In addition, GSK will certainly seek a 
more significant profit in the future, from a second-generation, higher-efficacy vaccine. 
 
It should be noted that malaria represents such a significant public health problem, such a 
profound cause of death and disability the world over that the standard for a successful vaccine is 
far different than for most other diseases. A vaccine with 50% efficacy wouldn’t be considered a 
success for many diseases, but for malaria it is exactly what the global health community is 
seeking at the current time. The Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI) “Roadmap,” published in 2006 
with their goals for research milestones over the coming years, set the following major 
milestones: “ By 2015, develop and license a first-generation malaria vaccine that has a 
protective efficacy of more than 50% against severe disease and death and lasts longer than one 
year…By 2025, develop and license a malaria vaccine that has a protective efficacy of more than 
80% against clinical disease and lasts longer than four years.” (242) Even a vaccine with 50% 
efficacy would be expected to reduce malaria mortality by half, saving hundreds of thousands of 
lives per year. (243) Cost-effectiveness analyses of the RTS,S vaccine have estimated that it will 
be cost effective in a variety of settings. An analysis of Malawi found the vaccine more cost-
effective than no intervention and than the current standard intervention, insecticide-impregnated 
bed nets, and it was deemed “very cost effective” by Malawian standards. (244)The fact that a 
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malaria vaccine has proven technically more challenging than vaccines for some other diseases is 
another reason that a lower efficacy vaccine is considered acceptable: “malaria vaccine 
development is hindered by the sheer complexity of the parasite and its life cycle, extensive 
antigenic variation, and a poor understanding of the interaction between P. falciparum and the 
human immune system.” (245) Subunit vaccines like RTS,S (which uses the CSP subunit) seem 
to be an effective approach, but even these have some difficulty stimulating a sufficient immune 
response to kill the malaria parasite. (246)  
 
Conclusion 
The development of the RTS,S malaria vaccine and the efforts to ensure its implementation in 
the future represent the work of a large and diverse partnership representing interests from 
industry, nonprofits, governments and militaries, and academic institutions. Since the threat of 
malaria is such a significant one, it has been able to garner a broad support base and a relatively 
large source of funding (although many would say that far more funding is needed). Many 
smaller, less prevalent or well-known diseases may simply not be able to do likewise. In 
addition, while the pharmaceutical industry has been a cooperative player in this process, it has 
still done so with significant monetary support and publicity motive, reminding us that while 
philanthropy may be a small part of corporate motivation, profit will always reign supreme. 
Nonetheless, the malaria story may have a happy ending someday because so many strong and 
strongly vested interests will push progress forward and maintain accountability. There will be 
no hepatitis E story of a neglected vaccine, or hepatitis A story of a vaccine not reaching the 






Looking for Solutions 
 
Framing the Problem 
Military research has shown itself to be generally successful in achieving its research goals—
perhaps even highly successful, considering the relatively limited resources it is afforded. As 
several case studies have shown, it could benefit from a more streamlined, actively managed 
process, as well as a less industry-reliant one, and many working in the system or evaluating it 
independently have supported this viewpoint. The combination of dependence on industry to 
finish the final steps of the research and approval process, to produce vaccines to meet the 
military’s needs, and to do this without a dynamic military system that is able to adapt to the 
market forces that guide industry is doomed to fail at times. 
 
As a background to the discussion of what should be done to improve vaccine access, we must 
not forget that access to newly developed vaccines in the developing world is a problem hardly 
limited to products developed in part or in whole by the U.S. military. In recent years, vaccines 
for rotavirus and HPV—both of which have large applicability in both developed and developing 
countries—have gained widespread acceptance, but initially were used in a limited fashion in 
low and middle-income countries. A vaccine for Rotavirus, a diarrheal disease that affects nearly 
all young children and kills between 400-500,000 globally each year—almost all in Africa and 
Asia—became available in the United States in 2006, and is on the CDC’s vaccine schedule. 
(247, 248) The vaccine has been on the radar of nonprofit organizations since the early 2000s, 
and PATH and GAVI spearheaded a program to ensure the rapid introduction into the countries 
that need it most. In 2009, South Africa was the first African nation to introduce the vaccine—
the only country to do so—and more rapid introduction of the vaccine has only begun in the past 
several years. It is now in use in 23 African countries, but more than half remain without vaccine 
access. In fact, of the five countries with the highest number of deaths from rotavirus—India, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ethiopia—only one, Ethiopia, had 
a vaccine program in place as of 2013. (249) 
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Recognizing the universal challenge of widespread vaccine access, what steps might the military 
consider to improve vaccine access while still operating within its mission and its budget? 
Fortunately, many of the recommendations that might benefit military access to medical 
technology could also benefit our overseas partners and their respective public health agendas. 
Increased creativity in finding funding and partnerships could allow for broader use of vaccines 
once they are developed, and could help ensure their availability to the military. Integrating 
nonprofit organizations into the fold traditionally occupied by the military and industry has 
proven effective, and nonprofits serve both as a source of funds and as lobbying bodies to 
pressure industry to establish price controls and subsidies for the developing world. The current 
WRAIR-GSK-MVI partnership is a prime example of what nonprofits are capable of, although 
the fact that such collaboration developed around a disease as significant as malaria is 
unsurprising. Smaller scale or more regional diseases might require a more active approach to 
finding or building partnerships between industry, nonprofits, foreign governments and 
militaries, but they are far from impossible. The Thai-Sanofi Pasteur partnership is a prime 
example of a smaller scale relationship that has provided mutual benefits to both parties 
involved. And while CRADAs are intended to favor American companies, the military may even 
consider cooperative efforts with foreign producers, such as Thailand, which would allow us to 
directly support economic and health development in our partner nations. Ebola also provides a 
current example of the diverse partnerships possible. The collaborations between academia, 
smaller biotech firms, and several governments represent a unique example for a much smaller 
scale disease—albeit one that is so deadly that it inspires perhaps inordinate attention and 
occupies a unique space in the popular imagination. And even in the case of Ebola, it took a 
frightening epidemic for the most rapid research progress to occur. 
 
When we consider military-specific process improvements, an active intention to consider open 
access to intellectual property for partners would be an important step. Senior researchers have 
commented in an independent fashion on the importance of supporting our partners, and we have 
already discussed the fact that this support might benefit the U.S. military’s strategies goals in 
our consideration of hepatitis E; however, the organization as a whole has not moved in this 
direction. In the civilian world, a movement for open access to technology, particularly that 
developed by academic institutions, has gained strength in the past decade. Much like the 
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military, universities often partner with or license their innovations to industry, and although 
these innovations were developed with university funds and resources and often with public 
research funding (such as NIH grants), historically there has been little appreciation of the fact 
that universities might have an obligation to ensure that their innovations are used for the 
common good. Open access, particularly for vaccines (like hepatitis A) with a large market in the 
developed world, could allow countries like Thailand to produce generic drugs at costs that make 
them available in their economy. 
 
A complete rethinking of the government’s role in vaccine development may also be a valid 
approach, and this could be coupled with increased integration with other government agencies.  
 Historically, military researchers and the NIH have often worked on similar projects and 
frequently collaborated. This type of partnership could be enhanced, and given the geographic 
relationship of the NIH, Walter Reed, and WRAIR, this would be far from difficult. In addition, 
while the military currently has the Pilot Bioproduction Facility for small-scale production, the 
NIH has looked at expanding their own similar capability from pilot scale to full production 
capacity. This decision was based on several factors, including the expense, difficulty, and time 
involved in transferring technology to outside manufacturers. (250) The impetus for this change 
was the recognition after the 9/11 attacks that having the ability to fast-track vaccine production 
might be necessary to mitigate bioterrorism threats, and that industry partnerships simply could 
not respond quickly enough to an evolving bioterrorism situation. Following the NIH’s lead or 
working with them to utilize their facility might be a highly effective way for the military to 
adopt a vaccine production mission. While funding for such a significant undertaking would 
undoubtedly be hard to come by initially, we should not forget that the U.S. government is one of 
the world’s largest contributors to global health initiatives of all kinds. In fact, in early 2015, the 
government announced its plans to contribute $1 billion to GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, over the 
next four years. (251) This very money will likely come back, indirectly, to support projects and 
products developed by the U.S. government (via the NIH) or the U.S. military.  If $1 billion in 
funds are available to support nonprofits that work for vaccine access, it seems that funds could 
be found to develop a government facility for producing vaccines that could be provided, at cost, 
here and abroad.  
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This paper has mentioned three potential approaches to improving military partner access: more 
diverse and intentional partnerships, open licensing of technology to low-income partners, and 
expanding the military’s production role. We will now examine open-licensing more thoroughly, 
which is an approach that has never been used by the military and which would represent the 
most fundamental philosophical change in the approach to vaccine research. We will conclude 
with a brief review of several of the military’s highest profile, ongoing vaccine projects—Ebola, 
HIV and Dengue. These serve as a reminder of the importance of the projects the military 
contributes to. 
  
The Open Licensing Movement 
Although its research efforts have obvious implications for global health, the Department of 
Defense does not currently abide by provisions for generic production or tiered pricing in the 
licensing of vaccines or drugs developed in its laboratories. In fact, although such policies are 
relatively new for research institutions in general, gaining momentum primarily in the past 
decade, the idea of the government maintaining control of the technologies it funded is not 
entirely new. Prior to 1980, federally funded research patents were maintained by the 
government; in that year, with the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, companies gained the ability to 
exclusively license technology, increasing their inventive to develop and produce these 
technologies. (252) At the time, the Bayh-Dole addressed an important problem of low 
technology uptake by industry; however, one could argue that the pendulum has now swung in 
the opposite direction, with industry exerting inordinate control over technology at the expense 
of access and to the detriment public health interests in certain cases. The open-licensing 
movement might be seen as a backlash to this pendulum swing.  
 
In late 2009, seven institutions signed a Statement of Principles and Strategies for the Equitable 
Dissemination of Medical Technologies. This agreement, which has since gained an additional 
19 signatories (including the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease Control), 
articulates a basic set of principles surrounding the concept of global access to technology, 
namely that member organizations “are committed to implementing effective technology transfer 
strategies that promote the availability of health-related technologies in developing countries for 
essential medical care.” The document not only focuses on ensuring that signatories seriously 
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consider the opportunity to promote global generic rights that is presented during the licensing 
process, but also encourages organizations to make a concerted effort to conduct research into 
neglected and under-researched diseases. (253) In the latter area, the military is already a leader; 
in the former, we believe that it could quickly become one. 
 
The open-licensing movement that culminated in the 2009 Statement of Principles started as a 
result of the frustration of scientists with the failure of their work to reach the people who needed 
it most; in that case, difficulty in the humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF)/Doctors Without Borders’ efforts to expand antiretroviral treatment for HIV in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Stavudine, an early and much-prescribed antiretroviral drug, was originally 
developed and patented by Yale University, then licensed to Bristol-Meyers Squibb. In 2001, 
MSF approached Yale University seeking rights to develop generic stavudine for use in South 
Africa, where at the time over 10% of the entire national population and 25% of pregnant women 
were infected with HIV. (254, 255) When William Prusoff, co-inventor of stavudine, learned 
about the availability issues surrounding his drug he wrote in a New York Times editorial:  
 
I once helped create a drug that could enable millions of people to lead better and 
longer lives. At Yale University's pharmacology laboratory, my late colleague Dr. 
Tai-shun Lin and I developed d4T, an antiretroviral drug that now forms part of a 
'cocktail' used by people with H.I.V. and AIDS. The patent was held by Yale, 
which licensed it to Bristol-Myers Squibb for development. At great expense, 
Bristol-Myers took d4T through the necessary trials, then brought the drug to 
market under the name Zerit. More recently, it became apparent that the drug Dr. 
Lin and I had developed was not reaching millions of desperately suffering people 
because they lacked the money to purchase it (256)  
 
Researchers and students pushed Yale University to use its power as the stavudine patent holder 
to pressure Bristol-Meyers to allow the drug to be made more available in developing nations.  
Almost immediately, the company reduced the drug's price from $2.23 per daily dose to $0.15, a 
93% decrease, and removed restrictions on generic versions in developing countries. (257) This 
series of events also resulted in the development of Universities Allied for Essential Medicines 
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(UAEM), an international student organization focused on promoting global access to medicines 
as a way of advancing public health. Since 2001, UAEM has brought attention to issues 
surrounding drug access, and has forced universities around the country to examine how the 
medical technology developed in their laboratories is cost prohibitive for many patients. Because 
of UAEM's activism, many universities, academic medical centers, and other research 
organizations, including both the National Institutes of Heath and the Centers for Disease 
Control, have promised to partner with pharmaceutical companies on drug development in a way 
that will allow for essential technologies to be available in developing nations and to work 
according to the principles espoused in the Statement of Principles and Strategies.   
 
Open Licensing and the Military – A Way Forward? 
The U.S. military stands in a unique position to promote global health and the interests of the 
government by considering participation in the open-licensing movement. Unlike many 
universities, the military conducts focused research into a variety of infectious diseases—many 
of them so-called “neglected diseases”—with the intent of producing a vaccine or treatment that 
will ultimately support military readiness by promoting the health and wellbeing of service 
members. They also share a common motivation with the greater U.S. government to promote 
global health for the purposes of national security and defense, and since 2001 this has been an 
area of particular focus. From funding priorities to repeated mention in the official National 
Security Strategy, public health is now and is likely to remain an important consideration for 
American policy makers. (258) Finally, the military and government devote vast resources to 
biomedical research, drug and vaccine production and purchase, and contributions to global 
health, many of which are redundant. A commitment to open-licensing might have the power to 
reduce costs not only for patients in developing countries, but also for American taxpayers, who 
fund government efforts in research and public health.  
 
Like the NIH and CDC, the DOD is funded by federal money, and has thus invested taxpayer 
dollars into the initial discovery, development, and often clinical trials of various vaccines and 
drugs before licensing them to corporations. These corporations, which may fund the 
culmination of research efforts—in the case of military research, they often complete clinical 
trials, secure FDA approval, then manufacture a product—do contribute substantially to the 
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development of a drug, but also receive countless millions in free research from government labs 
and scientists. Additionally, since 1981 the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit has 
provided pharmaceutical companies the ability to receive up to a 20% tax credit for the resources 
that they spend on the development of drugs or vaccines. (259) In these ways, the federal 
government can pay for a substantial portion of the research a private corporation needs to bring 
a drug or vaccine to market, and this represents a major investment by the taxpayer (who, 
through direct payment or insurance premiums, will often be a consumer of the same products 
they have helped to fund).  Since licensing of military technology to private corporations is 
usually conducted to ensure that a drug or vaccine is manufactured for military use, the 
government often ends up being the direct purchaser of the drugs it has helped to develop. 
Indirectly, the government also pays corporations for drugs it helped to develop when it funds 
other organizations that buy drugs for the developing world.  In 2013, the U.S. government gave 
$227,421,000 to UNICEF; UNICEF has traditionally been the largest purchaser of vaccines in 
the world, spending $493,000,000 in 2006. (260, 261) USAID gave $78,000,000 to the Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) in 2010.  That same year GAVI spent 
$506,000,000 on new and underused vaccine programs. In addition, in 2015 the U.S. owed 
$66,486,090 to the Pan American Health Organization and in 2010 gave over $400,000,000 to 
the World Health Organization. (262, 263)  And, as previously mentioned, the U.S. recently 
committed $1 billion to GAVI. This results in the U.S. Government paying multiple times for the 
vaccines that its scientists and funding have helped to develop. 
 
To complete the illustration, we will return to the case of malaria, on which the military and 
GSK have partnered for over 25 years with the intent of developing a vaccine. Based in large 
part on the substantial funding provided by MVI, GlaxoSmithKline recently announced that it 
will not seek to make a profit off any sales of the RTS,S malaria vaccine. Instead, it plans to sell 
the vaccines at a price that will allow it to cover the $300 million that it cites as its costs in 
developing the vaccine, plus 5% overage that it intends to reinvest into additional research 
projects. (239) This situation provides an excellent example of how a non-profit and 
pharmaceutical company can work together on a goal of critical importance to global health, and 
it also demonstrates the close alignment of military research interests and global health.  
However, care should always be taken when relying on a private corporation to sell a product “at 
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cost,” particularly when there is no oversight authority to confirm the cost calculation, when “at 
cost” sale of a malaria vaccine makes for excellent free publicity, and when comparative profit 
expectations for many other drugs are so incredibly high as to make reduced profit seem like 
generosity. Additionally, it is far from clear whether GSK's cost calculation includes 
administrative costs and overhead, or whether tax benefits associated with research are deducted 
from the cost calculation.  As Oxfam and MSF noted in a recent report on vaccine access:  
 
“in exchange [for $200 million in funding from MVI], GSK has agreed to an 
undisclosed set of volume-dependent price ceilings. It is difficult to know if these 
prices are substantially different from the prices GSK would have asked if it had 
developed the vaccine without help from MVI,” and that “MVI's role in the 
development of RTS,S has been primarily to subsidize clinical development by 
GSK. Although it is impossible to know for sure what path the vaccine would 
have taken without this subsidy, it is likely that development would have been 
abandoned or greatly slowed: GSK had apparently terminated work on RTS,S 
until MVI began to share costs.” (264)  
 
Perhaps more interestingly, it has been noted that much of the difficulty of establishing a malaria 
vaccine, and presumably much associated funding, came from the challenge of developing and 
testing an adjuvant for the vaccine.  This is technology that could theoretically be used by GSK 
in the development of a future HIV vaccine, for which there would undoubtedly be a significant 
profit margin. (265)  
 
While it is important to acknowledge that GSK has made great steps towards improving access 
to their drugs and vaccines, it should also be recognized that corporations must always consider 
self-interest and profit in their decisions; moreover, a corporate decision to support greater access 
to its products is frequently a move motivated by outside pressure, and exploited for positive 
publicity. Open licensing, in contrast, would provide a much greater guarantee of competitive 
pricing in developing countries. On this topic, the U.S. State Department has reported to 
Congress that “[I]n every case generics prices present an opportunity for cost savings; in some 
cases, the branded price per pack of a drug is up to 11 times the cost of the approved generic 
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version,” and that “since sales of the patented, brand-name versions of such medicines are 
minimal or non-existent in many impoverished regions of the world, allowing generic versions of 
those medicines will have minimal impact on the sales of brand-name, patented versions in such 
regions, or the licensing revenues of publicly funded research institutions, while saving an untold 
number of lives.” (266)  
 
Some might argue that committing to open licensing will only add to what is sometimes a 
difficult task for the military—finding a private licensing partner to manufacture necessary drugs 
and vaccines for military use. As has already been demonstrated, a number of military vaccines 
have fallen out of production because of concerns about cost-effectiveness and profit on the part 
of a private manufacturer, and in the case of the RTS,S vaccine, substantial philanthropic 
funding was necessary to entice a private company to continue research and development. If 
such intervention is necessary for a disease that kills some 800,000 people per year, it is easy to 
see why diseases that are much more limited in their impact might present an even greater 
challenge. (233) Nonetheless, the model of RTS,S malaria vaccine development provides a 
powerful possibility for other diseases—the potential for collaboration between the military, 
private corporations, and humanitarian or philanthropic organizations. By seeking out partners 
that might share the military's interest in certain infectious diseases because of global health 
applications, the military could gain additional support, and potentially funding, that could be 
used to find a manufacturer to develop and produce a drug or vaccine. By publicizing its 
commitment to open-licensing, the military would not only promote its status as a leader both in 
infectious disease research and in equality of access, it may gain new partners interested in 












Vaccines have changed the way we think about infectious diseases—in many cases, they have 
completely removed our fear of diseases that were once scourges. Several case studies have 
shown us how infectious diseases have come to the attention of the military, how military 
research contributed to understanding them and to developing vaccines for them, and what effect 
this work has had subsequently. These cases have also shown how inconsistently the military’s 
partners have benefited from their support of our research. The examples thusfar have focused 
primarily on stories that are complete; this diminishes that fact that major projects are still 
underway, and the policy critiques and recommendations made in the previous chapter could still 
have very real implications for diseases affecting millions of people, most of them outside the 
military and the United States.  
 
Present Research 
Briefly, we will now examine the ongoing vaccine projects in the military in order to help gain 
perspective on the magnitude of the threat from infectious diseases and reflect on how our 
understanding of public health might change with the completion of these vaccines. Although 
many of these diseases do not touch the lives of the average American on a daily basis, they 
nonetheless have a remarkable effect on the lives of billions of people worldwide. The military’s 
ongoing projects are also a reminder of how significant the issue of public access to publicly 
developed medical technology remains.  
 
HIV 
In 1986, recognizing the potential impact of HIV-1 on military readiness and national security, 
Congress directed the creation of the organization now known as the U.S Military HIV Research 
Program with the goal of conducting research on the newly discovered virus. From its 
beginnings at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), the program now works 
from six countries. In the mid-2000s, the program gained publicity for its work on the RV-144 
HIV-1 vaccine, a vaccine that is primarily the result of military research. Conducted in Thailand, 
trials on 16,000 human volunteers found that vaccination conferred a modest protective effect 
against HIV-1 infection, the first accomplishment of its kind in HIV research. (267, 268) The 
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results of this trial were announced in 2009 and since then, additional trials have been carried out 




The military is a collaborator in the Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative, a continuation of 
decades of military research and development into Dengue fever vaccination that has resulted in 
a number of vaccine trials and collaboration with the pharmaceutical industry. (269, 270) 
Dengue appeared in the Caribbean in 1963 with a major outbreak in Puerto Rico; prior to that, 
the last outbreak had occurred during the Second World War. Six years later after the Puerto 
Rico outbreak, the Caribbean experienced another major outbreak. The spread of dengue into 
this hemisphere raised red flags in the public health community. Rates of dengue and 
hemorrhagic fever in Central America rose rapidly through the 1990s and 2000s. Texas had its 
first case in 1980, and experienced an epidemic in 2005. Florida began to report cases in the last 
2000s. Outbreaks were simultaneously increasing in frequency in Asia. (164, 271) Given the 
geographic range of the aedes aegypti mosquito and hence dengue endemnicity, the U.S. military 
has had extensive experience with the disease during foreign deployments in the Philippines, 
World War II and Vietnam. More recently, smaller American operations in Somalia and Haiti 
have resulted in small numbers of hospitalized troops, and Special Operations members, many of 
whom are deployed to Central and South America and Asia, show a sero-prevalence rate of 
approximately 10%. (271) 
 
Through a partnership established in 1994 with researchers at several American universities and 
Thai research institutes, researchers at AFRIMS contributed significantly to research on the 
pathogenesis of dengue. (41) AFRMIS also worked on research into the epidemiology of dengue. 
(179) Military research institutes are involved in development of at least three vaccines against 
dengue, including one that is a collaboration with GSK and completed Phase II clinical trials in 
2010. (272) That vaccine was subsequently modified and is currently undergoing Phase I trials. 
A vaccine by Sanofi-Pasteur may be the first to complete Phase III trials and enter the 
marketplace, although it has limited efficacy (topping out at 60%), so there remains significant 




The recent West Africa Ebola outbreak has also drawn attention to a major area of military 
research, Ebola, which is one of a number of emerging or reemerging infectious diseases of 
interest to the military. Since 1976, when the first cases of Ebola were reported, the military 
began research into the virus and possible treatment options. Although the military has never 
experienced a case, since 2001 in particular Ebola has been recognized as a potential 
bioterrorism threat, and in 2014, the U.S. Army made a large deployment of troops to help fight 
the West Africa Ebola outbreak, heightening the sense that a protective vaccine is necessary for 
the military in war and peace. The current outbreak has also sped along the research process, and 
there are now two vaccines undergoing clinical trials, both of which were developed through 
collaborative efforts including USAMRIID scientists. There are also a number of experimental 
drugs in various stages of progress, many of which have been developed with military support, 
either financial support to biotech companies or within military labs.  
 
The ChAd3 (GSK/NIAID) Ebola vaccine was developed by NIAID scientists in collaboration 
with USAMRIID and industry and received significant media attention in August 2014 as it 
became the first Ebola vaccine to enter clinical trials. Early results were released in November 
and show that it is safe and well-tolerated by recipients and that it did instigate an immune 
response. An additional trial was also conducted in Europe, and simultaneously GSK produced 
an additional 10,000 additional vaccine doses for future trials in Africa. This trial was tentatively 
planned for Mali and the Gambia owing to established infrastructure in those countries, but as of 
late January 2015, GSK had shipped these additional doses of its vaccine to Liberia in hopes of 
starting a 30,000 person clinical trial in the setting of the ongoing Ebola outbreak in that country. 
(49, 274-276) 
 
The rVSV vaccine followed the GSK/NIAID vaccine into clinical trials at the Walter Reed Army 
Institute of Research in fall 2014. The technology behind the vaccine was originally developed 
by the Canadian government, and in 2010 it was licensed to an American biotech firm with the 
intent of modifying the vaccine for human use. The company, BioProduction Systems, has 
worked in conjunction with and has received financial support from the Department of Defense. 
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The phase I clinical trial, which began in October 2014, was conducted at WRAIR. (277) 
Although movement towards trials has been swift, there have been some contentions that it has 
not been swift enough, and many have blamed disputes over intellectual property rights and 
hitches in the collaboration between the various players participating. One WHO expert did 
suggest that the speed with which the GSK-NIAID vaccine was able to enter trials was “due to 
the fact that the partnership behind [the GSK vaccine] is more experienced.” (278) 
 
The military has had a part in a vaccine called VesiculoVax and a number of Ebola drugs as 
well. TKM-Ebola, an experimental Ebola drug that was developed through a collaboration 
between USAMRIID, Boston University and Vancouver-based biotechnology firm Tekmira, is 
currently undergoing Phase I clinical trials. (279) Zmapp, which was famously used to treat 
several American patients with Ebola, is intended to grant patients passive immunity to Ebola 
through a combination of three antibodies, one of which was developed at USAMRIID. The 
biotech firm developing the drug, Mapp Pharmaceuticals, is supported by a 3 year, $10 million 
contract with the DOD. (280)  
 
Looking Ahead – Future Research and an HIV Vaccine 
Colonel Samuel Martin, commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit in Kenya, 
presented a realistic picture of how military leaders and researchers view their work when he 
said: 
We are as interested in these diseases as the local people and institutions with 
which we partner.  For us, these diseases are a threat to our deployed military; for 
our partners, they cause major public health problems. We need our partners as 
much as they need us: You can’t do that final step of testing the efficacy of new 
drugs, new vaccines, unless you are somewhere where the disease occurs at a 
high-enough prevalence. We are not an aid agency. We’re here because we need 
those products…Discoveries we make go a long way toward helping Kenyans and 
civilian populations in many places. (281) 
 
As this quote makes clear, the DOD's first focus in any endeavor is military readiness, and 
research to support the health of troops is no exception. This focus may sometimes come at the 
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expense of focus on the question of how military research and technology might be best 
employed to assist partner nations and international communities, although Colonel Martin also 
makes it clear that these partners are essential to the research and development progress. Their 
access should therefore not be an afterthought given the resources and focus the U.S government 
spends on public health and stability. Consideration of access to military-developed products 
need not be more difficult than a reexamination of the technology licensing process, and 
adopting one of the several approaches, some of which have already proven effective for past 
vaccines—collaboration with nonprofits or foreign producers, adoption of open-licensing 
principles, or even expanding to take on a production role, which would benefit the military, the 
nation, and our foreign partners. 
 
While the DOD's main focus is and should be the national security of the country and the 
protection of its soldiers from disease, it falls short of being a leader in the greater medical 
community and of protecting national interests when it ignores how its technology is used after 
licensing. It also limits its ability to meet its own medical needs by failing to recognize potential 
partners outside of industry, and failing to see linkages between its interests and the interests of 
the remainder of the U.S. government. Moreover, if it appreciates the significant of these points 
but fails to put concrete policy measures and procedures into place, access for the neediest 
populations still cannot be ensured. Relying on the goodwill of private corporations to ensure 
that licensed drugs and vaccines are made available is simply not good policy. While it appears 
that, in the case of malaria, a vaccine will be sold at a reasonable cost due largely to the efforts of 
MVI, there is no guarantee that this will be the case in the future.  If the military contributes to 
developing a vaccine for HIV-1—a vaccine that would undoubtedly garner large profits in the 
developed world—but does not defend generic competition in low and middle-income countries 
during any ensuing licensing process, millions of people stand to lose an incredible opportunity 
to protect their health. Likewise, the military will have lost a valuable and unique opportunity to 
build ties with humanitarian organizations, allied governments, and to promote national security.  




AIDS is not just a compelling moral issue, it is not just a humanitarian issue; it is 
far more than just a health issue. It is a security issue. It is a destroyer of nations. 
It is a destroyer of societies. It has the potential to destabilize regions, perhaps 
even entire continents. It can tear social fabric apart within any nation. It can rob 
young democracies of citizens they need to build freer, better futures for 
themselves and for their children. HIV/AIDS is an economic issue, leaving 
nations without human resources to grow and develop, ultimately sapping global 
well-being. (282) 
 
The same is true for most of the diseases the military has contributed its money, manpower, and 
innovative spirit to. Security, international relations, and health are all intimately intertwined, 
and the military, through its impressive history of medical research, has already acknowledged 
this. It need only recognize its power not just to innovate in research, but also its power to 
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